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This paper is an in-depth study of qualitative physical reasoning about one particular
scenario: using a box to carry a collection of objects from one place to another. Speciﬁcally
we consider the plan, plan1 “Load objects uCargo into box oBox one by one; carry
oBox from location l1 to location l2”. We present qualitative constraints on the shape,
starting position, and material properties of uCargo and oBox and on the characteristics
of the motion that suﬃce to make it virtually certain that plan1 can be successfully
executed. We develop a theory, consisting mostly of ﬁrst-order statements together with
two default rules, that supports an inference of the form “If conditions XYZ hold, and
the agent attempts to carry out plan1 then presumably he will succeed”. Our theory is
elaboration tolerant in the sense that carrying out the analogous inference for carrying
objects in boxes with lids, in boxes with small holes, or on trays can reuse much of the
same knowledge. The theory integrates reasoning about continuous time, Euclidean space,
commonsense dynamics of solid objects, and semantics of partially speciﬁed plans.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
How does a box work? You won’t ﬁnd an explanation in The Way Things Work [21] or at HowStuffWorks.com, for the
very good reason that any fool can see without assistance how a box works; and if you can’t see it, an elaborate explanation
won’t help. Indeed, the question, “How does a box work?” seems almost ill-formed; it violates the Gricean condition that a
question must admit a useful answer.
That people do indeed understand, in a productive and general sense, how a box works1 is evidenced by the fact that
they can reason about how the functionality of a box relates to the geometric and physical properties of the box itself and
the objects it is used with. They understand, for example, that objects cannot come out of a closed box; that objects can be
carried in an open box, if the box is moved smoothly and held upright; that objects will fall out of an open box if it is turned
upside down; that more and larger objects will ﬁt in a large box than in a small box; and so on. These inferences can be
carried out using only qualitative information about the geometry of the boxes and objects involved; precise speciﬁcations
of the geometry and material properties is not required. The knowledge involved is not speciﬁc to boxes; much the same
knowledge is used in the commonsense understanding of trays, shelves, drawers, and so on.
✩ My thanks to David Stewart, for information about the current state of the art in scientiﬁc computation in the theory of rigid solid objects; to Steve
LaValle, for discussions about the relations of this work to robotics; to Leora Morgenstern and Vladimir Lifschitz, for discussions of non-monotonic inference;
and to the reviewers for helpful suggestions. This research was supported in part by NSF grants IIS-097537 and IIS-0534809.
E-mail address: davise@cs.nyu.edu.
1 As opposed to, for instance, a theory that posits that the people’s interactions with boxes can be characterized in terms of stimulus/response behavior
that subjects learn from positive and negative reinforcement when they put objects into boxes and take them out.0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.04.006
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PDDL theory of boxes.
(define (domain Box)
(:types object location)
(:predicates (at ?o - object ?l - location)
(in ?o ?b - object)
)
(:action load
:parameters (?o ?b - object ?l - location)
:precondition (and (at ?o ?l) (at ?b ?l) (box ?b))
:effect (and (in ?o ?b) (not (at ?o ?l))))
(:action move
:parameters (?o - object ?l1 ?l2 - location)
:precondition (at ?o ?l1)
:effect (and (at ?o ?l2) (not (at ?o ?l1))))
(:action unload
:parameters (?o ?b - object ?l - location)
:precondition (and (in ?o ?b) (at ?b ?l)
:effect (and (at ?o ?l) (not (in ?o ?b))))
)
But, of course, what is obvious to people can be very diﬃcult to make obvious to computers. Currently there exist
implementable theories at two levels that can be applied to boxes. On the one hand, there is the exact theory of rigid solid
objects: given exact geometrical and material speciﬁcations of the box, of the objects inside, and of the motion of the box,
one can calculate exactly the resulting motions of the objects.2 On the other hand, one can develop a discrete, abstract
representation of the domain of boxes, using ﬂuents like “in(O , B)” and actions like “putin(O , B)” and “move(B, L1, L2)”.
(Table 1 shows one such representation in PDDL [28].)
What is lacking is a theory at an intermediate level; a theory that, on the one hand explicitly deals with the geometry of
the objects and motions involved, and, on the other hand, allows those geometries to be speciﬁed partially or qualitatively.
Clearly it is often important to be able to reason at such a level; exact geometric characteristics of objects may be unknown,
or one may wish to reason about classes of situations generically, or one may wish to reason about a system at an early
stage of design, before the exact geometry has been decided on. Clearly, also, human commonsense reasoning is often able
to deal with such reasoning without diﬃculty. Our objective in this paper is to develop a representation and a theory of
moving objects in boxes at this level.
This paper is thus a contribution to a small corner of the research programme ﬁrst pioneered by John McCarthy nearly
ﬁfty years ago [22,23]. In the very earliest days of AI, McCarthy foresaw that the representation of commonsense domains
and the automation of commonsense knowledge would be one of the major challenges in constructing intelligent programs;
and that formal logic would be a powerful tool in constructing well-deﬁned representations and powerful inference tech-
niques. The years that have passed since then have entirely conﬁrmed McCarthy’s original insights. Though short-term and
small-scale progress in AI has often been made through the deliberate and systematic avoidance of issues of common-
sense reasoning (see e.g. [5], pp. xvii–xviii), it has become ever clearer that, in the long run, no general intelligence can
be achieved without dealing with these issues, and that using representational systems that lack a well-deﬁned logical
semantics yields no real advantages and inevitably leads to muddle [26]. The research in this paper has also been deeply
inﬂuenced by other aspects of McCarthy’s work, particularly his study of non-monotonic inference [24] as a critical feature
of commonsense reasoning, and his advocacy of elaboration tolerance [25] as a desideratum in the development of domain
theories.
The other major inspiration for the research in this paper is Pat Hayes’ “Naive Physics Manifesto” [17], which advocated
carrying out McCarthy’s representation project in the particular area of commonsense physical reasoning.
The direct practical applications of a qualitative theory of boxes — e.g. for household or industrial robots that deal
with boxes; for deep understanding of natural language texts that describe the use of boxes; or for interpretation of video
showing manipulation of boxes — would hardly in itself justify, in terms of a cost-beneﬁt analysis, my labors of writing
this paper, your labors of reading it, and the labors, not yet begun, of implementing it and integrating it with such an
application [7]. Boxes arise too rarely in these applications; it would be much more cost-effective either to use one of the
levels of representation and reasoning that currently exist, to contrive some application-speciﬁc hack, or to live with the
slight gap in functionality entailed in an imperfect understanding of boxes.
Rather, the importance of the theory we develop here is as part of a general theory of qualitative physical reasoning.
There is good reason to hope that large parts of the conceptual analysis, the representation, and the formal theory can be
carried over to a more general theory of qualitative physical reasoning; that our experience in developing the theory of
2 This is actually more problematic than one might suppose, as we will discuss in Section 2 below.
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and broadly applicable as to justify the very large costs of development [19].
This paper will deal with one speciﬁc, basic use of boxes: an open box can be used to carry a collection of objects, the
cargo, from one place to another place. More speciﬁcally, we are concerned with the following plan (henceforth plan1)
Load the objects one by one into the box;
Move the box to its destination.3
In this paper, we will formulate a set of qualitative boundary conditions on the box, the cargo, and the initial state suﬃcient
to support the inference that plan1 will execute successfully. We will present a formal theory in which this inference
can be carried out; this theory integrates continuous time, Euclidean space, physical dynamics of solid objects, and the
semantics of partially speciﬁed plans. We will give an extensive sketch of the formal proof of the correctness of the plan.
The key characteristic of our analysis is that the veriﬁcation is achieved using only qualitative geometric and physical
speciﬁcations. Neither the number nor the shape of the cargo objects is constrained and the shape of the box is constrained
only by the requirement that it is a box and is substantially larger than the combined size of the cargo. We do not have
to assume that other objects do not exist,4 only that they do not directly interfere with the loading and the carrying. The
trajectories used in loading the blocks and in carrying the box are a little more constrained, but they too are permitted
a large measure of freedom. Furthermore, we do not require that the objects remain in the position in which they are
released; they may topple over or shift around, either when they are originally released, or when some other object is
loaded on top of them, or while the box is being carted around. However, though they shift, they remain in the box; this is
one of the main functions of a box. Therefore the planner does not have to make sure that he loads the objects in a stable
position.
To ensure that our theory is elaboration tolerant [25] to a reasonable degree, and is not narrowly conﬁned to this one
speciﬁc problem, we have kept a number of variant problems in mind. The theory is designed to extend fairly easily to
support the following variant inferences and scenarios:
1. Infer that, if the box is turned upside down and held that way while being carried, the objects will fall out, and the
plan will fail.
2. Infer that, if one or more of the cargo objects is attached to the ground then they cannot be loaded into the box.
3. Infer that, if the box is attached to the ground, then it cannot be carried to the destination.
4. Infer that, if the trajectory of the box is bumpy enough, then cargo objects may be thrown out and the plan will fail.
5. Infer that, if object O is placed inside box B1 which is then placed in box B2, and B2 is carried to L2, then both O and
B1 will come along with it.
6. Infer that, if a lid is placed on the box after it is loaded and kept there while it is carried, then the objects will stay in
the box regardless of the motion of the box.
7. Infer that, if a lid is placed on the box before it is completely loaded, then the loading cannot be completed.
8. Infer that objects may be placed on an open tray and carried from one location to another, but that they cannot be
piled as high or moved as roughly as in a box.
9. Infer that objects can be carried in a box with holes in the bottom or sides, like a milk crate as long as the objects are
too large to fall through the holes.
Due to limitations of time and space, we have not carried out a complete formal analysis of any of these variants, but
we are quite conﬁdent that the theory presented here can be extended without substantial diﬃculty to cover all or most
of these. Speciﬁcally, inferences 1, 4, and 8 would certainly require additional physical axioms. The extensions needed for
1 and 4 should be straightforward; inference 8 is substantially more challenging. Note that, if one uses an open tray as in
inference 8, objects must be stacked stably and maintain a ﬁxed position, or one risks their falling off the side of the tray.
The other inferences do not require any new physical axioms; these can all be carried out within the current theory with
at most the addition of some additional geometric deﬁnitions and lemmas. Similarly, we have designed our theory so that
it is not inconsistent with the standard Newtonian theory of solid object dynamics (see Section 2.1), with the idea that the
two theories can be merged in future work.
One particular objective in this paper is to formulate the physical knowledge used in terms that avoid or minimize
the use of differential equations and forces, which are central to the Newtonian theory. As discussed at length in [6],
analysis in terms of forces and of behavior over differential time is particularly unsuited to qualitative reasoning in this
domain, because many scenarios which can be simply characterized over extended time are both extremely complicated
and extremely unstable when analyzed over differential time. Consider dropping an object on the ground and watching it
settle to a stable state. The characterization of its behavior in differential terms, between the time it ﬁrst hit the ground
3 We had originally hoped to include a ﬁnal step of unloading the objects one by one; but it turns out that formulating conditions that guarantee that it
is possible to unload the cargo raises new and diﬃcult problems. We hope to return to this in future work.
4 Readers who are not KR researchers may be surprised that this is worth mentioning; but such strong “closed world” assumptions are in fact ubiquitous
in automated commonsense reasoning and planning.
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come and go. It is also very unstable; the exact sequence of impacts, forces, slidings, and so on depends very delicately and
discontinuously on the exact shapes and material properties and the initial conditions. The characterization of its behavior
over extended time is very simple and robust; within a few seconds, it is at rest on the ground, not far from the initial
point of impact. As we shall see, our theory achieves this objective to a very large degree; in fact, the physical theory we
need for this problem makes no reference to velocities, accelerations, or forces.
Let us make clear at the outset a few objectives that this paper does not attempt to achieve:
• We assume a single agent. The semantics is not easily extended to a world with multiple agents.
• It does not cover all cases in which it is commonsensically obvious that the plan works.
• It does not derive the rules from “ﬁrst principles” of Newtonian physics, for reasons that will be discussed below.
• It does not support reasoning about likelihood, or relative likelihood. We hope to address this in future work.
• It does not discuss how this reasoning could be implemented in practice.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related work, in mathematical physics (Section 2.1), in AI qualitative
physical reasoning (Section 2.2), and in robotics (Section 2.3). Section 3 gives a pre-formal analysis of plan1, discusses the
many ways in which the plan can fail, and presents ways to formulate the boundary conditions, the physical constraints, and
the plan itself so that the plan can be relied on to succeed. Section 4 shows how this domain theory can be expressed in a
formal ﬁrst-order theory. Section 5 sketches a proof of the correctness of plan1; a complete proof is given in a Web-based
appendix at http://cs.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/box-proof.pdf. Section 6 summarizes our results and discusses future work.
2. Related work
Previous work relevant to the research described here falls into three categories: mathematical physics analyzing the
Newtonian dynamics of rigid solid objects (Section 2.1), work in AI on qualitative dynamics of rigid solid objects (Sec-
tion 2.2), and work on robotic planning (Section 2.3).
2.1. The Newtonian theory of rigid solid objects
The study of the dynamics of solid objects, idealized as perfectly rigid, was begun by Galileo and Newton and continued
by physicists and mathematicians of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. It has recently enjoyed a revival
of research interest because of its many applications, which include physical simulation, robotics, computer-aided manu-
facturing, animation, virtual reality, and video games. Recent research includes modelling issues (how best to model the
interactions of rigid objects), computational issues (how to effectively compute the behavior of a system of rigid objects),
and theoretical issues (showing that every well-posed boundary value problem has a solution). Nonetheless, there remain
many fundamental unsolved problems in this domain. Stewart [36] surveys the literature and discusses the state of the art.
In the kinematic theory of rigid solid objects, an object O is characterized by its shape, which is the region of space that O
occupies in some standard position. We will assume throughout this paper that the shape of an object is bounded, regular
(equal to the closure of its interior), and has a connected interior. In this section, though not in the remainder of the paper,
we will further assume that the boundary is smooth; that is, there is a unique tangent plane at every boundary point. The
position of object O at time T is determined by a rigid (orthonormal) mapping, called the placement of O at T . The region
that O occupies at time T , called the place of O at T is equal to the image of the shape of O under the placement of O
at T .
The kinematic theory consists of three constraints:
1. Each object maintains a ﬁxed shape. This is guaranteed by the above constraint that the place of O at T is related to
its shape by a rigid mapping.
2. The placement of O at time T is a continuous function of T .
3. If O1 = O2 then the places of O1 and O2 at T do not overlap.
The kinematic theory is unproblematic and well-understood.
The dynamic theory extends the kinematic theory in the following ways: An object is further characterized by a density
distribution over its shape, its coeﬃcient of friction against other objects, and its elasticity. For each object O , at each time
T1, the limit of derivative of the placement of O at T as T approaches T1 from below, and the limit as T approaches T1 from
above, both exist, though they are not necessarily equal. We will call these the velocity before T1 and after T1 respectively.
Two objects O1 and O2 that are in contact at a given time may interact in one of two ways: First, they may exert a force
on one another, distributed over the region of contact. Alternatively, when two objects collide, they may exchange a ﬁnite
quantity of momentum instantaneously through exerting an impulse force on one another.
In addition to forces between objects in contact, there are external forces, particularly the earth’s gravity and forces that
result from the actions of autonomous agents. In most problems, some objects are speciﬁed to be ﬁxed; that is, they do not
move under any circumstances.
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4.A. F = Mdv/dt , where F is the net force on an object O , M is the mass of O , and v is the linear velocity of the center
of mass of O .
4.B. J = Mv , where J is the net impulse forces acting on object O , and v is the discontinuous change in the linear
velocity; i.e. the difference between the linear velocity of the center of mass after T minus the linear velocity of the
center of mass before T .
4.C. T = I d ω/dt , where T is the net torque, I is the tensor of inertia, and ω is the angular velocity.
4.D. W = I ω where W is the net impulse torque and  ω is the discontinuous change in the angular velocity.
Newton’s third law asserts that:
5. The force (ordinary force or impulse force) exerted by O1 on O2 at point P is exactly equal to the negative of the force
exerted by O2 on O1 at P .
Finally, contact forces between objects are generated in the following ways: (The generation of external forces lies outside
this theory; the external forces are given as boundary conditions in a problem.)
6. (Constraint forces.) Two objects in contact may exert constraint forces on one another. The direction of constraint force
from O1 on O2 at contact point P is normal to their common tangent at P and points out of O1 into O2. The
magnitude of the constraint force is just large enough to ensure that, when all the forces are combined, the non-
overlapping condition is maintained.
7. (Coulomb friction.) Suppose that O1 and O2 are in contact at point P ; there exists a non-zero constraint force N
between O1 and O2 at P ; and the surfaces of O1 and O2 are moving at velocity v relative to one another at P . If
v = 0, then there is a sliding frictive force from O1 to O2 whose direction is −v and whose magnitude is μk| N|, where
μk is the kinetic coeﬃcient of friction between the material of O1 and the material of O2. If v = 0, there is a static
frictive force between O1 and O2 whose magnitude is at most μs| N| and whose value is such that the equations of
motion have a solution. The coeﬃcient μs is the static coeﬃcient of friction.
8. If O1 and O2 are in contact at point P at time T1 and their velocities before T1 would cause them to interpenetrate
in the neighborhood P , this is a collision at P . The result of a collision is that O1 and O2 exert an impulse force on one
another directed along the normal to their common tangent. There are a number of different models for determining
the magnitude of this force; Newton’s “experimental law” is often used but is sometimes problematic. All of them
involve a real-valued parameter, the coeﬃcient of restitution, which depends on the material properties of O1 and O2.
9. If O1 and O2 collide at time T , and they are part of a set of objects S which are spatially connected at T , then the
impulse force between O1 and O2 may propagate to the other objects in S (e.g. a cue billiard ball hitting into a set of
other balls, or a croquet mallet (O1) striking one ball O2 and knocking away a second ball). It is not well-established
how best to model this propagated impulse.
10. If O1 and O2 collide at point P at time T1 and their surfaces have a relative velocity at P which has a non-zero
component vt in the common tangent plane, then the two objects exert an impulse force on each other in the direction
−vt . This is seen, for instance, in the way that the spin of a ball may change at a collision. Again, it is not well-
established how to model this interaction.
11. Under some circumstances, the equations of motion only admit a solution if there is a impulse force between two
non-colliding objects. See D. Stewart’s solution to the Painlevé paradox [35,36].
The formalization of this theory is further complicated by the fact that two objects may be in contact at a ﬁnite collection
of isolated points, at every point on a curve, at every point on a surface, or at the union of a surface, a curve, and isolated
points, and that the place and form of contact can change discontinuously over time.
There are a number of unresolved issues in formulating this theory. Ideally, one would like to have a theory that
(a) agrees well with experimental measurements, up to the limits of the idealization;
(b) has at least one solution for every well-posed boundary-value problem;
(c) is demonstrably equal to the limit of the theory of elastic solids, as the elasticity goes to zero;
(d) is demonstrably the limit of numerical computation, as the precision increases and the time-step goes to zero.
But this ideal has not yet been attained. Strong results, speciﬁcally the existence of a solution for well-posed boundary-
value problems, have been proved only under restricted conditions. There are a number of different sets of conditions that
have been proved suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of a solution; the following is typical:
• Two objects are only in contact at a ﬁnite collection of points, not over an extended region.
• The normals at the contact points between two objects lie in a single hemisphere.
• Collisions are inelastic.
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is mostly on issues in theoretical physics and philosophy of science, rather than on detailed physical models. For example,
the axiomatization presented by Adams [1] includes only items 4.A and 4.C above; it does not even include the constraint
that objects do not overlap.
The needs of knowledge-based commonsense reasoning are rather different from those of scientiﬁc computation. In a
theory of commonsense reasoning, coverage is more important than precision; it is better to be able to rule out grossly
impossible behaviors in all situations than to be able to give precise answers over a limited class of situations.
Let me conclude here with some general comments about the relation between the scientiﬁc theory of solid objects and
commonsense knowledge of the same domain. The scientiﬁc theory intended to deal with every possible case of a collection
of objects sliding, spinning, rolling, and colliding. However, the problems that arise in everyday life are almost always much
more constrained in one respect or another. Indeed, there is no reason to think that commonsense understanding is very
good at dealing with the general case; naive subjects ﬁnd as basic a phenomenon as gyroscopic motion baﬄing and hard to
believe even when directly experiencing it.
In ordinary situations, people are usually interested in maintaining a very large measure of control over the objects they
interact with; and it is hard to achieve control over an object that is moving freely.5 Also, a free motion of an object is
likely to end in a collision; and people avoid subjecting objects to collisions for fear of damage. Commonsense reasoning is
thus primarily concerned with cases where objects either stay where they are without need for intervention, or with cases
where an agent moves an object in a controlled way. On the other hand, a commonsense theory must to some extent take
account of uncontrolled free motion, if only to be able to allow some useful predictions in the cases where this happens by
accident.
In physics, the base case of the theory is an object moving with constant velocity under Newton’s ﬁrst law without
external forces.6 In commonsense reasoning, the base case is an object sitting motionless on a table.
2.2. Qualitative physical reasoning
This project continues the work on qualitative reasoning about solid objects reported in [6], which presented a logical
analysis of the inference that a marble dropped inside a funnel would fall out the bottom of the funnel. Rule-based ap-
proaches to commonsense physical reasoning ultimately derive from [17]. Bennett et al. [3] presents a purely geometric
theory of rigid object kinematics in a language entirely deﬁned in terms of the primitives “Region R1 is a part of region
R2”, and “Region R is a sphere”.
Some of the fundamental diﬃculties and limitations of this methodology are discussed in [7]. A current survey of work
in AI physical reasoning may be found in [10].
Previous work on qualitative reasoning about kinematics includes [12,29]. Forbus et al. [14] extend these to include
dynamic analyses of certain kinds. Gelsey [15] reports a simulator for predicting the dynamic interactions of solid objects.
All of these require an exact shape description of the objects involved to be input. De Kleer’s NEWTON program [11]
and Forbus’s FROB program [13] carried out qualitative prediction of the behavior of point objects interacting with ﬁxed
constraints whose shape is qualitatively described. Stahovich et al. [34] present a system for qualitative analysis of a limited
class of dynamic systems; this is similar to [14] but more elegant and more clearly deﬁned, though more limited in scope.
They claim that their system can work from a rough sketch of the objects involved, but it is not clear how this works.
2.3. Robotics
The literature on robotics discusses many of the same issues as are addressed here, but from a suﬃciently different
angle that the techniques applied there are rarely directly applicable here. (LaValle’s [18] recent textbook is an extensive
and excellent survey of robotic planning.) We will discuss brieﬂy a couple of issues that these two lines of research have in
common; a more extensive comparison is beyond the scope of this paper.
Analysis of the mechanics of manipulation. As we will discuss below, in this paper we limit ourselves to an extremely
simpliﬁed model, in which a disembodied agent moves one object at a time through telekinesis, but in a broader setting,
commonsense knowledge is aware of and reasons about physical aspects of manipulation, and we hope to address these
in future work. Even in this setting, however, it seems likely that there is a divergence between the roboticists’ analysis
and the analysis needed for commonsense reasoning. Roboticists must carry their analysis to the level needed to actually
execute the manipulations involved, whereas it would seem that commonsense reasoning stops at a more abstract level,
and leaves the ultimate implementation in muscular forces to learned control patterns. On the other hand, robotics research
5 The most common contexts involving freely moving objects are aircraft and spacecraft; military and hunting projectiles, from slingshots and arrows
to guns and grenades; and sports that involve balls, pucks, shuttlecocks and so on. I think it is safe to say that, with the exceptions of sports, dropping
trash into a basket, and perhaps tossing bags of laundry, most contemporary Americans rarely deliberately toss or drop any large solid objects. I should be
interested to learn of any further exceptions. Note, by contrast, that liquids and collections of small solid objects like salt or coffee are generally poured.
6 The rotational motion of such an object can be surprisingly complicated.
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an agent can effectuate in any circumstance.
Information limited planning. A very interesting branch of recent robotics research studies how a robot with limited
knowledge of the environment can nonetheless plan to achieve speciﬁed goals (see [18], Chaps. 11 and 12). These studies
obviously have elements in common with qualitative reasoning about planning; both deal with constructing plans in situa-
tions that are not completely speciﬁed. But there is, I think, an important distinction centering around the standpoint of the
reasoning being done. The information space analysis in robotics takes a ﬁrst-person approach: the agent who is reasoning
is the robot who is acting, and he has to get enough information to be able to actually carry out the actions involved.
Qualitative reasoning takes a third-person approach: the reasoning is being done by someone other than the agent himself
who has partial knowledge of the situation and wants to be able to reason that an agent, who may himself be omniscient
or who may have limited knowledge, would be able to carry out a partially speciﬁed plan.
Direction of inference. Finally, both robotics planning research and AI planning research focuses almost exclusively on
constructing and executing plans to meet speciﬁed goals. In commonsense reasoning this is only one of many possible
reasoning tasks. Other directions of inference include determining that a given goal cannot be achieved; inferring character-
istics of the environment or the agent from the execution of a plan, or from the failed attempt to execute a plan, and so on.
All these draw on the same kind of knowledge as plan construction, and therefore a general domain theory should support
all of them and a general knowledge-based reasoner should be able to carry all of them out.
3. The execution of plan1: pre-formal analysis
Our central objective in this paper is to validate plan1; that is, to show that, under suitable conditions, plan1 is a
reasonable plan and can be expected to succeed in achieving the goal of moving a collection objects to a destination. The
hard part of this analysis is actually at the pre-formal7 level: deciding which issues should be addressed in detail, which
should be idealized, and which should be ignored; what problems should be covered; what knowledge must be used; and
what assumptions must be made. Once all this is determined, the translation of this analysis into logical notation is, as we
shall see, comparatively straightforward.
We will assume throughout this paper that objects can be idealized as rigid and solid; thus, we do not have to worry
about the box breaking or the objects becoming crushed.
3.1. A model of manipulating an object
An execution of plan1 consists primarily of a sequence of manipulations of individual objects. We therefore start our
analysis of the plan by formulating a theory of manipulation.
What kinds of manipulations are in fact possible for a given physical agent depends on the geometry of its manipulators
and the geometrical and physical constraints that govern them. For real agents, animal or robotic, these tend to be compli-
cated. In order to abstract and simplify the details of the manipulator, we will use instead the following idealized model
of manipulation: we conceptualize the agent as, so to speak, having telekinetic powers over one object at a time. That is,
the agent may choose any object OM and may move it along any physically possible path; we need not specify how the
physical manipulators of the robot could actually reach, grasp, and move the object to accomplish this. The motion of the
manipulated object OM may cause motions of other objects, either because of kinematic constraints or because of frictive
forces. If other objects are in the way of the attempted motion of OM then OM will exert a force on them. If this force
causes the other objects to move out of the way, then the motion is possible; if not, the motion is impossible.
The effect of the idealization is to abstract away the robot’s actual manipulators. For instance, as compared to the
capacities of a human hand or an anthropomorphic robotic hand, this idealization allows us to ignore such issues as what
positions of the ﬁngers and palm relative to the object allow the object to be grasped; the space occupied by the hand;
the constraints on motion placed by the structure of the hand and arm; and the limits on the strength of the hand. For
the most part, therefore, the idealization is more powerful than a real manipulator. There is one thing, however, that a
real manipulator can do that this idealization cannot; namely, to directly move more than one object at a time. A human
hand can hold several small objects simultaneously, but our idealization does not allow this. (We could, of course, change
the idealization to specify that the agent can move arbitrarily many objects within reach simultaneously. However, this is
undesirable, because an agent who could do this has no use for boxes; it can simply carry all the cargo directly.) In future
work, we hope to consider more realistic models of manipulation.
7 We do not mean to suggest that methodologically, “pre-formal analysis” is or should be completed before formalization begins. On the contrary, the
process of constructing formal axiomatizations of domain knowledge and formal proofs gives important insights into the inherent nature of the knowledge
involved. In practice, research proceeds on all three fronts concurrently.
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Let us begin by writing out plan1 in more detail. Let oBox be the box, uCargo be the set of cargo objects, oTable1
be the surface initially holding the objects, and oTable2 be the surface to which we wish to move the loaded box. Then
we deﬁne plan1 in pseudo-code as follows
plan1 ≡
{ while (not all objects in uCargo are inside oBox)
{ O1 := some accessible object uCargo outside oBox;
load O1 into oBox;
}
move oBox from oTable1 to oTable2;
}
Three characteristics of plan1 will be critical for our analysis. First, plan1 is hugely underspeciﬁed. In particular,
a complete implementation using our idealized robot would have to specify how the plan executor is to choose the next
cargo object to move, the position within (or above) the box at which to release each object, and the trajectory along which
to move each object and the box.
Second, plan1 is very well suited to reasoning with qualitative information. It makes no a priori assumptions about
the number, shapes, material properties, or initial positions of the cargo objects involved. Neither the agent himself nor an
external reasoner needs to have this information to see that this is a reasonable plan; indeed, the plan is often executable
by an agent who never gets this information. For instance, an agent with no visual or other precise spatial perception and
with only an approximate idea of the position of its own manipulator may well be able to execute the plan by groping for
the objects, getting them inside the box, and releasing them.
The third characteristic is not a feature but a problem; as we elaborate below in Section 3.3, there are a large number
of ways in which the plan can fail. If we wish to posit conditions that allow the conclusion “The plan is guaranteed to
succeed” to be inferred with certainty, then we must necessarily posit quite restrictive conditions on the spatial and physical
characteristics of the box and the cargo, and we may also have to impose greater speciﬁcity in the plan statement. That is,
we have to negotiate a three-way trade-off between
(a) adding further speciﬁcations to the plan;
(b) requiring that the objects and box meet more restrictive conditions;
(c) allowing the conclusions we draw to be plausible or likely but uncertain.
The trade-off between constraining the class of objects and specifying the plan amounts to the observation that, by using
more intelligence about how to carry out the plan, one can apply it successfully to a substantially greater class of objects.
This is not surprising; packing a box eﬃciently is, after all, an enterprise that requires some thought and skill, and is not
achieved by tossing objects at random into the box. The trade-off between degree of certainty and the other two categories
amounts to the observation that plans carried out haphazardly or in borderline circumstances are more likely to go wrong;
again, this is not surprising. In this paper we will explore a small number of ways in which these trade-offs can be made.
There are many different combinations of conditions and plan speciﬁcations that, to a commonsense understanding, justify
the conclusion that the plan [necessarily/probably/possibly] will achieve the goal; the theory developed in this paper will
cover only a small fraction of these, though of course a complete theory commonsense theory of boxes would cover all of
them.
Establishing that plan1 is a valid plan to achieve the goal “The objects in uCargo are above oTable2” starting in
state s1 involves that showing that every step of plan1 will be executable at its proper time and that at the end of any
execution of plan1, the objects in uCargo are all above oTable2. Speciﬁcally, we need to posit or establish the following
propositions:
1. In s1, the cargo uCargo and the box oBox are all on oTable1.
2. At each iteration of the loading loop, there is some object O1 in uCargo that can be loaded into oBox.
3. After O1 has been loaded into oBox, O1 will be in oBox.
4. No cargo object exits oBox while O1 is loaded into oBox.
5. After the completion of the loading loop, it is feasible to carry oBox from oTable1 to oTable2.
6. No objects come out of oBox while it is being carried from oTable1 to oTable2.
7. After oBox has been carried from oTable1 to oTable2, oBox is on oTable2.
8. If oBox is on oTable2 and O1 is in oBox then O1 is above oTable2.
Clearly if the above propositions are true then plan1 is executable and succeeds in bringing the cargo uCargo to
oTable2. However, these propositions are not formulated in a directly usable form. In particular, as far as possible, we
want our problem to be formulated in such a way that we posit that state s1 satisﬁes a collection of speciﬁed conditions
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and that the plan is executed starting in s1; and then from these boundary conditions we infer the correctness of conditions
such as 2–8 above that characterize the world at later times. Our analysis below achieves this objective in large measure
but not completely. In particular, we need to posit isolation conditions that objects other than the cargo, the tables, and the
box do not interfere with the execution of the plan. (We could replace these with initial conditions on the external objects
which support the isolation conditions as an inference; however, it seemed to us that positing the weak isolation conditions
is more reasonable for commonsense reasoning than positing the much stronger initial conditions on external objects that
would be required.)
At the outset, let us assume some conditions that are obviously necessary or useful:
COND.1 In state s1, object oBox and cargo uCargo are stably supported on oTable1.
COND.2 There is a “protected region” manipSpace1 which contains uCargo and oBox and is large enough so that each
object can be moved through manipSpace1 into oBox; and it is guaranteed that no objects except uCargo,
oBox, and oTable2 ever enter into manipSpace1.
COND.3 The cargo uCargo ﬁts inside oBox. That is, there is a conﬁguration C in which each of the objects in uCargo is
in the inside of oBox and which is physically feasible in the sense that no two overlap.
COND.4 No other object reaches into the inside of oBox while it is being carried. (Condition COND.2 guarantees that this
does not happen during loading.)
COND.5 oBox can be fully on top of oTable2 in a stable position.
COND.6 There is a second “protected region” manipSpace2 which contains the starting and ending positions of oBox and
which is large enough that oBox can be moved through manipSpace2 from start to end while remaining upright.
No object other than oBox and uCargo enter into manipSpace2 during the execution of plan1.
3.3. Potential problems and their ﬁxes
Given conditions COND.1–COND.6 above, what can go wrong with the plan? Actually, it can go wrong in more ways
than one might at ﬁrst suppose. (For convenience of cross-reference, I include here with each bug a forward pointer to the
discussion of how the bug is addressed.)
BUG.1 oTable1 itself interferes with the loading of some object O1 into the box, or with carrying of oBox away from L1.
E.g. O1 or oBox is fastened to oTable1; or oTable1 encloses O1 in a cage. (Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
BUG.2 In the process of loading O1 into the box, it may knock against one of the other cargo objects which then falls out
of the protected region manipSpace1 and gets trapped by some other object, so that it can no longer be loaded.
(Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
BUG.3 The target conﬁguration C in which uCargo ﬁts inside oBox may be unattainable, for any of a number of reasons:
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a. It may be kinematically unattainable; e.g. it may depend on teleporting one object in uCargo into an inner cavity
of another object, or disconnecting two objects that are fastened together (Fig. 1).
b. It may be unstable; that is, if the objects are placed in C , they may fall into a different position where they are
not entirely inside the box (Fig. 2).
c. It may be dynamically unattainable; that is, it cannot be attained by an agent who can only manipulate one object
at a time and who is loading one object at a time (Fig. 3).
(All addressed in Section 3.3.2.)
BUG.4 It is possible that in loading O1 into the box, O2 will be carried along with it, and will end up in a position which
precludes completing the loading of the box. E.g. O1 is a box and initially O2 is inside O1, but the cargo can only
be ﬁt into O B if some other object O3 is placed inside O1 underneath O2. The plan plan1 does not include any
method for dealing with this, even if, intuitively, it is easily solved by moving O2 either before or after O1 has been
loaded (Fig. 4). (Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
BUG.5 Loading a cargo object into the box or lifting the box may cause a trap to be sprung (as in the opening scene of
Raiders of the Lost Ark), which prevents the completion of the plan. This can happen either when the cargo object is
lifted, when it is placed in the box, or when the box is lifted. (Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
BUG.6 The box may fall over during loading, or it may be knocked off the table. (Addressed in Section 3.3.6.)
BUG.7 Suppose that, at some stage of plan execution, object O1 is sitting on the long end of a lever O L, and a heavy object
O2 is dropped or falls onto the short end of O L. Then O1 can be catapulted far from where it is supposed to be
(Fig. 5). Speciﬁcally,
a. During loading, if O1 and O L are inside the box, and O2 is placed on the other end of the lever, O1 can be
catapulted outside the box. (Addressed in Section 3.3.5.)
b. During loading, if O1 and O L are outside the box, O2 is sitting on the other end of the lever, and O1’s end of
the lever is being held down by another heavy object O3, then lifting O3 to load it may cause the lever to be
released, catapulting O1 out of reach. (Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
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c. During carrying, if O1 is on lever O L inside the box, and the other objects inside the box shift in one way
or another, then O2 may fall onto the other end of the lever, catapulting O1 out of the box. (Addressed in
Section 3.3.5.)
There are also other, even more far-fetched, scenarios in which an object can ﬂy out of the box; for example, a tid-
dlywinks effect; or a wedge positioned in a crack between two heavy objects may be shot upward if the two objects
are squeezed together; or an elastic object like a basketball lying quietly on the ground may bounce upward if it is
hit sharply from the top. We will consider all such possibilities as coming into the category of BUG.7.
BUG.8 Objects may come out of the box while it is carried from oTable1 to oTable2.
a. If the box leans over too far, the cargo may fall out. (Addressed in Section 3.3.3.)
b. Similarly, if the box ﬁrst leans to the left, and then to the right, then the cargo objects may accumulate on the
left-hand wall and then be lifted up about the opening. If the box leans back and forth numerous times, then the
cargo can gradually climb the walls, being ﬁrst carried up with each rising wall and then settling down into a
higher position on the opposite wall. (Addressed in Section 3.3.5.)
c. If the motion of the box is very violent then the objects may be ﬂung out. (Addressed in Section 3.3.4.)
d. If the objects are very elastic and the motion is bumpy they may bounce out. (Imagine carrying a wooden box full
of ping-pong balls.) (Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
e. If the objects can roll or slide with little friction, and the inside of the box is curved (like a bowl) then they can
build up a “sloshing” resonant motion inside the box that eventually allows them to escape, even if the motion of
the box is quite smooth. (Addressed in Section 3.3.1.)
f. If the sides of the box are slanted out, and the motion of the box is bumpy, then a cargo object can be gradually
bumped up the back side of the box and eventually out. (Addressed in Section 3.3.4.)
g. If the sides of the box are slanted out, and the box is spun rapidly, then centrifugal force may pull the objects out.
(Addressed in Section 3.3.4.)
h. If there are many cargo objects (e.g. a heap of sand), then in the course of motion the heap of objects can shape
itself into a ramp or bowl, allowing an object to escape methods (d), (e), or (h), even if the sides of the box itself
are vertical. (Addressed in Section 3.3.5.)
With eight categories of bugs enumerated (plus subcategories), one might well wonder whether this is just the beginning
of a list that can be extended indeﬁnitely. As it happens, once we have addressed these bugs, we will have a plan that can
be formally validated, so this list of bugs is complete in the sense that it suggests a complete set of ﬁxes.
It should be noted that, with the signiﬁcant exceptions of bugs 5, 7, 8.b, 8.f, 8.g, and 8.h, all of these are familiar to
anyone who has extensively moved objects in boxes (that is to say, pretty much everyone), and people take them into
account in planning, executing, and correcting their box moving activities. (The same is true of the additional bugs with
variant boxes to be discussed in Section 3.4.) These are not at all unusual, and the strategies and conditions that we will
suggest to eliminate them are likewise formalized versions of commonsense understanding.
We need to exclude all these bugs one way or another before we can validate the plan. As discussed above, there are
three general categories of ﬁxes:
1. Imposing stronger conditions on the shapes, material properties, initial conﬁgurations, and exogenous motions of the
objects involved. Such conditions reduces the scope of the correctness proof, and require that the agent have more
complete knowledge of the state. This approach also leads to conditions on the plans that are more restrictive than
actually necessary. For instance, we will impose much stronger conditions than are actually necessary on the relation
between the size of the cargo and the size of the box, in order to be able to be able to prove the general statement that
whenever these conditions are met, the objects can be loaded into the box (see Section 3.3.2).
2. Making the plan more speciﬁc, so that the agent uses some intelligence and care about how he carries out the loading,
carrying, and unloading. This makes more demands on the agent; it also generally requires a more complex analysis in
generating the correctness proof.
3. Achieving less certainty in the conclusions; concluding that the plan is probably correct or correct by default rather
than that it is guaranteed to be correct.
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To begin with, we will posit some fairly stringent geometric and physical conditions. First, since our primary interest
in this paper is in the use of the box, not in the theory of disassembling heaps, we will assume that initially the objects
are all placed separately on the ﬁxed support oTable1, and that each object has a clear space above it, so that it can be
lifted vertically upward without touching any other object, and that it in fact is lifted without touching any other object.
Second, we will assume that the objects in uCargo cannot roll, have a high coeﬃcient of friction, and a low coeﬃcient of
restitution (that is, they don’t bounce).
These two assumptions, between them, eliminate BUG.1 (that oTable1 blocks the loading of some object), BUG.2 (load-
ing one object knocks some other cargo object out of the way), BUG.4 (that loading O1 brings O2 along in some interfering
way), BUG.5 (that loading an object or lifting the box will trigger a trap), BUG.7.b (that loading one object results in an
object that is outside the box being catapulted), BUG.8.d (bouncing objects out of the box), and BUG.8.e (objects sloshing
out of the box).
3.3.2. Fitting the cargo in the box
BUG.4, that the ﬁtting conﬁguration is unattainable, can be dealt with by requiring oBox to be much larger than
uCargo. We consider two particular kinds of conditions here, corresponding to different speciﬁcations of plan1. If we
want plan1 to allow the agent to place the objects anywhere at all that they ﬁt inside the box, then we can apply the fol-
lowing condition: Let maxDiam be the maximum diameter of any object in uCargo. Let rDeep be the region of all points in
the X–Y plane where the inside of oBox has at least depth maxDiam and let nSquare be the number of non-overlapping
squares of side maxDiam in rDeep. Then, as long the number of cargo objects is less than nSquare/4, they can be loaded
into the box in this way, since any cargo object already in the box can block at most 4 such squares.
The above result is not very satisfying since this does not allow any more cargo objects to be loaded in a deep box than
in a shallow one, as long as the depth is greater than maxDiam. Unfortunately, that is pretty much unavoidable with such
a weakly constrained loading strategy. The problem is that a suﬃciently perverse and ingenious agent may be able to use
the ﬁrst objects in uCargo to build a dome just inside the top of the box, which will make it impossible to add more cargo
no matter how large the volume underneath the dome. Note that our correctness proof is supposed to establish that the
plan succeeds however the agent chooses to execute it as long as he follows the constraints deﬁned in the plan; we are not
allowed to complain that the agent is following the letter but not the spirit of what we had in mind.
The following loading strategy is more effective: the agent is required to load each cargo object to a reasonably low open
position — not necessarily to the lowest possible position, just not to a position that is entirely higher than some other
option. Speciﬁcally, the agent is prohibited from loading a cargo object to position M1 inside the box if it is possible to
load it instead to some other position M2, such that highest point of M2 is lower than the lowest point of M1. If this not
very restrictive protocol is followed, then the following can easily be shown. Suppose that inside oBox there is an empty
rectangular cuboid of dimensions lCube long by wCube wide by hCube high. Then as long as the number of cargo objects
is less than
lCube /2 maxDiam · wCube /2 maxDiam · hCube /2 maxDiam
this loading strategy will get all the cargo into the box. In our formal axiomatization and correctness proof we will use this
plan and this constraint.
This analysis, too, is far from optimal; it generally overestimates the space needed in the box by a factor of 8, and makes
no allowance for the eﬃcient stacking of large numbers of long thin objects. Since the focus of this paper is not optimal
packing, we have pursued this no further here. Readers who want to try their hands at getting stronger results, however,
should note that, in the context of the theory in this paper, merely proving a geometric result, that there is a conﬁguration
in which all the cargo objects ﬁt within the box, is not suﬃcient because it risks running into BUG.3. You have to show
that, if you load the objects into the box, they will remain in or settle into a position in which they all ﬁt. “Remaining
in” is a problem in qualitative statics; “settle into” is a problem in qualitative dynamics. For instance, if you are loading
a set of pencils into a case, you need to show that they do not somehow arrange themselves into a complicated lattice
work that blocks further loading while leaving plenty of empty space within the box. Our proof of the correctness of the
strategy above does indeed allow the possibility that the objects settle within the box after they have been placed, but we
demonstrate that even if they do settle, the loading can be completed.
3.3.3. Tipping out
Bug 8.a, that the box is tilted so far in carrying that some of the cargo falls out, can be eliminated for the case of a single
tilting motion (i.e. without a gradual climbing of the walls, as in 8.b) by requiring that the object not be loaded too close
to the top of the box and that the box be kept close to vertical. Assume that, if any objects in the box settles into a new
position as a result of tilting the box, its center of mass moves downward in setting. Let O be any cargo object, and let F
be the diameter of O . Let H be the maximum horizontal distance between a point inside the box and a point in the top of
the box in the initial state; let D be the minimum vertical gap between the top of the box and the center of mass of O in
the initial state; and let φ be the maximum tilt of the box from the vertical orientation. If D cos(φ) > H sin(φ) + F then O
cannot be tilted out of the box (Fig. 6). (This additional gap of F is necessary to block the possibility of some curved object
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executing a “Fosbury ﬂop” in which the object can escape from the box while keeping the center of mass below the top of
the box.)
3.3.4. Smoothness of motion
Bugs 7.b (that cargo objects are ﬂung out of the box), 8.f (that the objects work their way up the back of the box in
a series of small bumps), and 8.g (that the objects are spun out of the box) could be eliminated by requiring that (a) the
cargo objects are not loaded too near the top of the box; (b) motions of the box moved smoothly and not spun rapidly; and
(c) the sides of the box are steep.
In fact, we have not included these conditions in our formal analysis; rather, for simplicity we have relied on the default
rule, introduced in the next section, that objects in a box generally do not move higher with respect to the box. However,
let us brieﬂy discuss the nature of these inferences in the more complete theory we eventually hope to attain.
Commonsensically, there is a multi-way tradeoff between the bumpiness and rotational velocity of the motion of the
box, the steepness of the sides of the box, the gap between the top of the objects and the top of the box, and the likelihood
that objects will come out of the box — one may as well throw in here the elasticity of the objects as well. However, this
tradeoff
• involves elements that are hard to quantify, such as the “bumpiness” of a trajectory;
• would be very hard to justify by a formal analysis based on Newtonian mechanics, even if one conﬁnes attention to
cases where the probability is 1 or 0;
• is almost certainly not known very precisely by actual commonsense (human) reasoners.
What reasoners do know, it seems reasonable to say, is a number of speciﬁc cases drawn from experience, and the
general structure of the tradeoff. This enables them to conclude that, for example, if the box is shaken up and down very
violently, the objects will certainly come out the top; that if you ﬁll a box to the brim with small objects and then roll it in
a wheelbarrow down a bumpy road, it is quite likely the objects will come out; and that if the cargo objects are inelastic
and you carry the box carefully and smoothly then the objects will certainly stay in the box. We hope to address these
issues in future work, but they are beyond the scope of the current paper.
3.3.5. Catapulting
BUG.7.a and BUG.7.c, that an object may be catapulted out of the box,8 are much more problematic than those we have
considered above. Two features of this bug are immediately apparent. First, it rarely if ever actually happens. My guess is
that no one in this history of packing boxes has ever been surprised by an object ﬂying out in this way.9 Second, it obviously
could happen if the agent speciﬁcally sets it up to happen. All that is needed is an object to act as fulcrum, an object to act
as lever (or a single bent object to act as both fulcrum and lever), a light object to act as missile, and a heavy object (much
heavier than both missile and lever) to act as trigger (Fig. 5). Further thought reveals a third feature; namely, that it is very
diﬃcult to formulate plausible constraints on the shapes of the objects or on the loading actions that suﬃce to make this
impossible. The fulcrum and missile need only be comparatively small; the shape of the trigger is entirely unconstrained.
The lever does have to be substantially longer than it is thick, but ruling out all objects of that kind — that is, requiring
8 We have already dealt with BUG.7.b in which an object on oTable1 is catapulted out of the protected area.
9 One of the reviewers disagrees, and thinks that probably this does occasionally happen in practice. Also, note, by contrast, that liquid spilling out of
the top of a pail, either in ﬁlling the pail or in carrying it (analogous to BUG.8) is quite common and requires care to avoid if the pail is nearly full.
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never actually comes up. Note that the trigger need not be the object being loaded, so it does not suﬃce to posit that
the agent sets each object down very gently in loading it; adding the new object, however gently, may disturb a carefully
balanced equilibrium and knock over some other object that will function as the trigger. One might think that one could
ﬁnd restrictions on the way in which objects are heaped and removed from heaps that would exclude this, but short of
doing an exact simulation, which defeats the whole point of qualitative reasoning, that seems very diﬃcult to do.
So what should be done? The obvious temptation is just to posit that it can’t happen, since it never does. But I am
afraid that this is a dangerous path. Quite clearly this can happen. It is not merely a theoretical consequence of Newtonian
physics, or a recondite case with specially designed objects; on the contrary it is quite obvious that anyone can make it
happen in a few minutes with a couple of household objects. Thus, a theory in which it cannot happen is inconsistent
with commonsense understanding of solid objects, and therefore cannot be extended to a general theory of commonsense
reasoning about solid objects. Note that this is quite different from, for example, saying that the theory of rigid solid objects
cannot be extended to a theory of non-rigid objects. The latter case has to do with theories of two very different scopes;
naturally, one does not expect to deal with non-rigid objects in formulating a theory of rigid objects. Here the natural scope
of the overarching theory is the dynamic theory of rigid objects, which includes both boxes and catapults. In this paper, we
happen to be dealing with boxes, but certainly we would certainly hope to be able to develop our theory as a subset of a
broader theory of rigid solid objects.
A second idea is to restrict the physics to quasi-statics, the limiting case where dissipative forces are always so large as
compared to momentum that no object can travel more than a negligible distance under its own inertia; they only move
when pushed by an agent or by gravity. Usually quasi-static theories are used in the context of two-dimensional objects
moving on a horizontal surface, but one could develop such a theory for three-dimensional motion; intuitively, you imagine
the entire scenario as taking place in a vat of Liquid Prell.10 But we have decided not to pursue this. First, this extension to
three-dimensional dynamics involves some technical diﬃculties (for instance, how fast should an object move in free-fall or
in falling over while partially supported?) Second, making this assumption obviously limits the generality of the theory.
A third idea is to move to a probabilistic theory, especially as we will eventually have to do that anyway, and say that the
catapulting is very improbable. However, as far as I can tell, this does not ﬁx the underlying problem, though it changes it.
The problem now is that a probabilistic theory must specify the probability of events, not just absolutely, but conditionally
as well. And the probability of catapulting, which is negligibly small under most conditions, becomes 1 on the condition
that the agent deliberately sets up a catapult. One might be tempted to say that it is very unlikely that the agent will want
to set up a catapult, but at that point we would be basing our physical theory on a theory of relative likelihood of goals,
which does not seem like a good direction to go in.
The best solution I have been able to ﬁnd is to use a default theory. Intuitively, we want to posit a default rule that
catapulting does not occur unless there is good reason to think that it might. Thus if we know that the agent has set up a
catapult and is triggering it, then the catapulting must occur, the theory predicts that it will occur, and the default does not
apply. If there is “good reason” to think that the agent may have set up and triggered a catapult, then the conditions of the
default rule are negated, and we are left agnostic as to whether the catapulting occurs. Otherwise, the default rule applies,
and we conclude that no catapulting occurs.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne an “upward-motion-free” history as one in which no object in a heap ever moves upwards with
respect to the object(s) supporting the heap. We then posit a default rule that histories are, by default, upward-motion-free.
The default rule does not apply to cases where an agent picks up the object directly or indirectly. (Some care must be taken
in cases where the heap is supported by several objects or the support tilts in the course of the history. We will give a
more exact statement in Section 3.7 after deﬁning “heap” in Section 3.6.)
This default rule also takes care of all the subcategories of BUG.8 except BUG.8.a, since they all rely on an object escaping
out the top of the box. This is indeed how we will deal with these bugs in our formal theory. A more complete theory would
contain rules that would specify exceptional cases in which these bugs are likely or certain to occur; given such rules,
one could then exclude the bugs for ordinary cases, either by using default rules or by explicitly negating their enabling
conditions.
Generally, the major diﬃculty in using a default rule of the form “Assume P unless P is impossible” is making sure that
P is not impossible; that is, P is not contradicted by anything else in the theory. For qualitative prediction, the following
approach is possible: Suppose that you are given qualitative information about the boundary conditions; that is, the shapes
and positions of the objects and the actions of the manipulator. If you can ﬁnd a speciﬁc instance I that satisﬁes the
qualitative constraint, such that when you run a Newtonian simulator on I , the defaults are satisﬁed, then clearly the
defaults are consistent with the boundary conditions and with Newtonian physics, and may therefore be applied.
Of course, going from a monotonic theory to a non-monotonic theory has many drawbacks. For our purposes, the most
serious drawback is that the value of establishing any particular inference shrinks dramatically, in the following sense:
In a monotonic theory, if you prove that Γ | φ, then you have simultaneously established that Γ ∪  | φ for any further
axioms . Thus, you have established the validity of inferring φ from a whole class of possible knowledge bases. By contrast,
10 A brand of shampoo that, some years ago, was the subject of a well-known advertising campaign featuring a demonstration that the shampoo was
particularly viscous. For some reason, this was supposed to imply that it was also particularly good shampoo.
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block any of the non-monotonic rules that you used to prove φ from Γ . In probabilistic theories, the situation is even more
diﬃcult; you have to show that φ is conditionally independent of  given Γ , or approximately independent.
A second general problem with non-monotonic theories is that it is very hard to be conﬁdent that they don’t have
unintended consequences. You can check that a monotonic theory is safe by constructing a model in which it is true; then
the consequences of the theory cannot be any weirder than the model. But non-monotonic theories do not have semantics
of this kind. (This is one reason that recent work on non-monotonic theory has tended to use the non-monotonic inference
to derive equivalent monotonic axioms; these can then be checked for validity in a model.) To alleviate this problem, we
try to keep our default rules as weak as possible, consistent with supporting our desired inference that objects ordinarily
remain in boxes during loading and carrying, so that there is as little risk as possible that the default rules have unintended
consequences.
Another problem is the Yale Shooting Problem [16]. Our default rule does indeed run into this; it allows a backwards
causality in which objects may be catapulted out at an earlier stage if that will prevent them from being catapulted out
later. However, since this only comes up in scenarios of Rube Goldberg-like complexity, I am not very concerned about it.
I don’t think there’s much point worrying about how to ﬁx this until one has addressed the underlying probabilistic issues.
It may seem odd that I should now be worrying about the Yale Shooting Problem at all since this problem was “solved”
many years ago. The diﬃculty is that all the solutions I know of (e.g. [20,33]) work by using closed-world assumptions to
derive a suitable frame axiom, in the manner mentioned above. If that would work here, I wouldn’t need a default rule at
all; I could just state the frame axiom monotonically. (The authors of these solutions are working with different underlying
constraints as to what constitutes an acceptable formulation of a prediction problem.)
Finally, it might be argued that the proposed default rule is just a way of disguising the argument, which we raised and
rejected above, that catapulting is unusual because agents rarely have the goal of ﬁring catapults. After all, if the population
of agents involved consisted entirely of seven-year olds who had just discovered the joys of catapulting things, then it might
be reasonable to assume, by default, that whenever a plan can be instantiated so as to ﬁre a catapult, it will be. Thus, our
proposed defaults above incorporate an assumption about the psychology of the agents involved. I don’t think this is right.
It seems to me that there are two separate plausible inferences involved here; ﬁrst, that the physical inference that loading
objects into a box randomly will rarely cause catapulting, and second, the psychological inference that agents engaged in
loading a box will rarely decide to construct a catapult. A physical theory of boxes must deal with the ﬁrst, independently
of the second.
3.3.6. The box falls over
There are at least four different scenarios that could give rise to BUG.6, in which the box falls over or is pushed off the
table while being loaded. The ﬁrst scenario is that if the walls of the box tilt outward, or the bottom of the box is rounded,
and the cargo is loaded at a point that is outside the region where the box is supported by the table, then the weight of
the cargo may make the box tip over onto its side (Fig. 7.A). We can exclude this by requiring that the center of mass of
every cargo object is above the convex hull of the contact points of the box with the table. It is easy to show that if this
condition holds, then any tilting by the box will raise the height of the centers of mass of the cargo objects; therefore, the
cargo objects cannot be exerting a force that causes the box to tilt.
A second scenario is illustrated in Fig. 7.B. By sliding down the slanted left-hand side of the box, O1 could exert suﬃcient
leftward force on the box to push its end over the table. The center of mass of the pair {O B, O1} would still be over the
table, but if you now load a heavy object O2 on the left-hand side of the box, the box could fall off the table.
A third scenario is illustrated in Fig. 7.C: a cargo object O1 sliding or rolling around a curve exerts enough horizontal
force to push the box over. (Note that if the side of the box is curved outward, then O1 exerts a centrifugal force whose
magnitude is dependent on the velocity of O1.)
A fourth scenario is that, in the course of loading the box, the cargo objects settle and hit the side of the box in such a
way as to knock the box over on its side. I ﬁnd it hard to draw a convincing picture of this, so I leave this to the imagination
of the reader.
The ﬁrst scenario is a quite plausible one, but as observed above, it is easy to ﬁnd conditions that demonstrably exclude
it. To exclude the remaining scenarios, we introduce the following default rule: If an object O B is stably supported on top of
object OT and a collection of object OC is initially piled in heaps on top of O B , and the centers of mass of all the objects
in OC remain over the convex hull of the points of contact between OT and O B , and OT remains motionless, then assume
by default that O B remains motionless.
We have fallen back on a default rule here, rather than look for conditions that are demonstrably suﬃcient in a Newto-
nian theory for a number of reasons.
• The second, third, and fourth scenario are uncommon. Violations of this default rule will be very infrequent.
• It seems to be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd qualitative boundary constraints of the proper form — that is, constraints on shape
and material properties, constraints that apply in the initial state, and constraints on the execution of the plan — that
suﬃce to ensure that these scenarios are impossible, particularly since the third and fourth scenario have a complicated
dependence on the velocities of the objects involved.
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• If one were to compute such constraints they would almost certainly be far more restrictive than necessary. It seems
pointless to impose highly restrictive conditions on the scope of our inference in order to exclude possibilities that are
in any case very rare.
3.3.7. Why not use defaults for all our problems?
Since we are in any case resorting to default rules into order to deal with bugs 6, 7, and 8, why not do this for all
the categories of bugs? In general, any place where we have required a condition to eliminate a bug, we could replace
that, either with a default rule that the condition holds, or, even better, with a default rule that the bug doesn’t arise. In
some cases, this would clearly be unreasonable; it would be absurd to say that, by default, a given set of objects uCargo
ﬁts inside a given box oBox. On the other hand, it would be quite reasonable to replace the absolute condition excluding
objects that can roll by a default rule that objects in general cannot roll. In the latter cases, whether or not to use a default
rule would depend on what kinds of information are actually available and what kinds of situations actually arise in a given
application. (There are, for instance, applications in which rolling objects are common.) Here, our objective has been to use
as few different default rules as possible; namely, the two default rules discussed in the previous two sections, which were
the only means we found to exclude bugs 6, 7.a, 7.c, 8.b, and 8.h. However we did not minimize the number of applications
of this rule needed; as discussed in Section 3.3.4, we have used this default rule to exclude bugs 8.c through 8.f, whereas
we could reasonably have excluded these monotonically by imposing further conditions.
3.4. Variants
We now turn to the variants on simple open boxes mentioned in the introduction: namely, boxes with lids, boxes with
holes in the bottom and sides, and trays. First as regards lids, we observe that if you cover the box with a lid and you can
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of the box during carrying, thus eliminating BUG.7.c and all the subcategories of BUG.8. (That is the main point of having a
lid.) You can also guarantee that no external object will enter the box while it is being carried, thus allowing the “isolation
condition” COND.6 to be weakened. The plan, of course, must be modiﬁed to add the step of placing the lid onto the box
between loading and carrying the box. We assume that the lid, like the objects in uCargo, is initially resting isolated on
oTable1 and that it ﬁts on the box when the box is empty. However,
BUG.9 The lid may no longer ﬁt on the box once the box is ﬁlled.
BUG.10 The lid may come off during carrying, either because
a. It falls off on its own (consider, for example, a lid which is just a ﬂat piece of cardboard laid over the top of the
box).
b. It is knocked off or removed by some external object during carrying.
c. It is knocked off by the clattering of the cargo inside the box.
Boxes with holes suffer from the bug that
BUG.11 Objects may fall through these holes at any stage.
For trays and overﬁlled boxes, condition COND.3 is replaced by the condition
COND.3′ The cargo uCargo can be arranged as stable heaps supported by oBox.
and BUG.3 and BUG.4 are modiﬁed accordingly. However, we introduce a new subcategory of BUG.8:
BUG.8.i Depending on the stability of the heaps, even quite smooth motions or small tilts may cause a heap to collapse,
potentially causing some object to fall off the heap.
The problem with trays is that it is very diﬃcult to formulate reasonable qualitative constraints on object shapes that
suﬃce to guarantee that the cargo can be piled in stable heaps on the tray; it is not even easy to guarantee that a single
object stays put on a tray. (For example, if an object has a round bottom, then, even if it is weighted so that it can only
roll very slightly and even if the tray is kept perfectly horizontal, the object can still gradually work its way off the tray
in response to very small accelerations and decelerations in carrying the tray.) To formulate a reasonably general theory
of trays, therefore, probably the right approach is to posit the qualitative condition that the cargo can be piled into stable
heaps on the tray; in particular circumstances, this itself may be inferrable from fairly precise speciﬁcations of the geometry
of the cargo. This indeed is the advantage of a box over a tray; once the cargo is inside the box, it does not matter whether
the objects shift their positions or not, as long as they do not move violently enough to run into bugs 8.b though 8.h. Also,
because of the walls of the box, stable positions of the cargo in the box can be made taller than on a tray and are easier to
attain.
We ﬁx the other bugs as follows:
BUG.9. We posit that the cargo ﬁts inside the box, and that the lid does not extend into the inside of the box.
BUG.10. We posit that the lid caps the box; that it is heavy enough as compared to the impacts of objects inside and out
that it is not knocked off; and that the trajectory during carrying is smooth enough that it is not ﬂung off that way.
BUG.11. We posit that the objects do not ﬁt through the holes.
Finally, if we consider the special case where the cargo consists of a single object, what is perhaps most striking is
how many of the potential bugs still remain. Speciﬁcally, BUG.1, BUG.3.a, BUG.3.b, BUG.5, BUG,6, all the categories of BUG.8
except BUG.8.h, BUG.9, BUG.10, and BUG.11 are still problematic (though BUG.3.a can easily be ﬁxed by positing that oBox
does not “close in” on itself). BUG.2, BUG.3.c, BUG.4, BUG.7, and BUG.8.h no longer apply.
3.4.1. Bugs and their ﬁxes: overall view
It may seem, on ﬁrst glance, that once we have limited our theory by this large collection of qualiﬁcations and default
rules there is not very much left. But in fact, most of these qualiﬁcations are essentially commonsensically obvious; a rea-
soner who sees that the cargo is too big, or that the carrying is very bumpy, or that the cargo can fall through holes in the
bottom and so on will expect that the plan may well fail. Though the exact formulation is driven by the need to formalize
and the desire to follow Newtonian physics as far as possible, these qualiﬁcations are, I would argue, basically part of a
commonsense understanding of the domain.
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3.5. The geometry of a box
There are a few more issues that we want to address at the pre-formal level before setting forth to turn our theory into
ﬁrst-order logic. The ﬁrst is the deﬁnition of what it means to be a box. We deﬁne an open box as a geometric predicate as
follows:
Deﬁnition 3.5.1. A region is a set of points that is connected, bounded, and topologically regular.11 The topological boundary
of region R , denoted “Bd(R)”, is the set of points in R that are not in the interior of R .
Deﬁnition 3.5.2. Let RB and R I be two regions. We say that RB is an open box with inside R I if the following two conditions
hold:
• The interior of R I ∩ RB is empty. (R I is externally connected to RB [30].)
• Bd(R I)–Bd(RB), the part of the boundary of R I that is not part of the boundary of RB , lies in a plane and contains a
circular disk of positive radius. (The latter condition is a topological condition to guarantee that the opening of the box
is not a single point or a single curve but is a true face that a small enough object can get through.)
Note that a given shape RB can often be construed as an open box with many different possible values for R I (Fig. 8).
Indeed, if RB forms an open box with one region of R I then necessarily there are many different possible values of R I ,
with faces running in many different directions, which are possible insides for RB . To give an intuition, if you can orient a
solid object with shape RB in some position where it holds water, and then you ﬁll some external cavity of O B with water
to some depth, then the region occupied by the water constitutes a possible inside for RB .
Given a box RB with inside R I , the outside of 〈RB, R I〉 is the complement of RB ∪ R I . An opening of 〈RB, R I〉 is a
connected component of Bd(R I)–Bd(RB); all the openings of 〈RB, R I〉 lie in a single plane.
If 〈RB, R I〉 form a geometric box, solid object O B has shape RB , and solid object O2 is inside R I at one time and
outside R I at a later time, then O2 must have exited through an opening of 〈RB, R I〉. Proof: Since O2 went from inside R I
to outside R I it must have gone through the boundary of R I and it obviously can’t go through the part the boundary of R I
that borders O B; end of proof. Therefore, if O2 is initially inside R I , and the opening of 〈RB, R I〉 is always higher than O2,
then it follows that O2 must remain inside R I .
3.6. Heaps and stability
A central concept in the qualitative physics of solid objects is that of a stable heap of objects. The precise deﬁnition of a
“heap”, a canonical example of a vague concept, is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but the following serves our purposes
here.
To begin with, in the commonsense setting we must distinguish between mobile objects, which can move, and ﬁxed
objects, which cannot. In a given state, a mobile object may be grasped by the agent; while it is being grasped, its motions
are controlled by the agent and are not affected by external objects. Thus, neither ﬁxed objects nor grasped objects are
11 A region is topologically regular if it is equal to the closure of its interior. This essentially requires that the region has some “thickness” in three
dimensions; it excludes curves, surfaces, shapes that are solid in some places and two-dimensional lamina in other places, and so on.
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free-moving in state S if it is mobile and not grasped.
A heap is a connected set of free moving objects; in our theory, unlike discussions of the Sorites paradox, a heap may
contain a single object. A heap of objects is deﬁned with respect to some set of supporting objects. Usually a heap actually
has a single supporting object, such as the ground or a box, but in some cases a heap may rest on multiple supports, such
as a board that is lying with ends on two different tables.
Deﬁnition 3.6.1. Let UH and U S be disjoint sets of objects, where UH is non-empty. In state S , UH is a heap with supports
U S if the following conditions hold in S:
• All the objects in UH are free-moving.
• If O1 is in UH and object O2 abuts O1 then O2 is either in UH or in U S .
• Each object in U S abuts some object in UH .
• If O A and O B are in UH then there exists a sequence13 O 1 = O A, O 2 . . . Ok = O B such that O i ∈ UH and O i abuts
O i+1.
A set UH is a maximal heap in state S if UH is a heap with supports U S and all the objects in U S are ﬁxed or grasped.
Equivalently, a maximal heap is a maximal collection of mobile, non-grasped objects connected by abutment; the supports
of a maximal heap UH are all the ﬁxed or grasped objects that abut some object in UH .
A number of consequences follow directly from this deﬁnition:
First, a ﬁxed object or an object being grasped can only be a support; it cannot be part of a heap. A mobile object
can be considered as part of a (non-maximal) heap or can be considered as a support; that is a matter of usefulness for
the reasoner. For instance, if one is loading objects into a box, it is sometimes convenient to think of the objects inside as
forming a heap (or several heaps) supported by the box, and it is sometimes convenient to think of the box together with
the objects inside as forming a heap. Both viewpoints are OK.
Second, in any state, the maximal heaps constitute a partitioning of the free-moving objects into equivalence classes,
where the equivalence relation is the transitive closure of the relation “O A and O B are both free-moving and abut”.
Third, two distinct maximal heaps cannot abut one another. Thus, around any maximal heap there is a clear space free
of any mobile objects. Since ﬁxed objects and grasped objects are not affected by the motion of mobile objects, this means
that a suﬃciently small motion of any mobile object can only physically affect objects in the same heap. Similarly, any
motion by a grasped OG can only affect mobile objects in heaps for which OG is a support. This gives us a very useful
limit on the causal impact of events.
Finally, if UH is a set of mobile objects that are connected through abutment but are in free fall, then UH is a heap
whose support is the null set of objects.
We next introduce the notion of a heap being stably supported in a given state. We will not give necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for this, but we axiomatize a couple of the properties that we will need here:
Deﬁnition 3.6.2. Let U1 and U2 be sets of objects. and let H be a history. U1 is isolated from all objects except U2 if no
object outside U1∪ U2 comes into contact with any object in U1.
Axiom 3.6.1. If UH is stably supported by U S in state S , then UH is a heap with supports U S in S , and U S is non-empty.
Axiom 3.6.2. Let H be a physically possible history with starting state S1. If heap UH is stably supported by U S in S1,
and U S is motionless throughout H , and UH is isolated except for U S and free moving, then UH is stably supported and
motionless throughout H .
Axiom 3.6.3. Let H be a physically possible history that is temporally unbounded in the future (in Section 4.3 we will call
this a “uhistory”). Let U S be a set of objects that is motionless throughout H . Let UH be a set of mobile objects disjoint
from U S . Assume that the objects in UH are not grasped at any time in H . Then eventually either every object in UH is
in a stable heap supported by some subset of U S or some object in UH comes into contact with some object not in U S .
Equivalently, if UH is free moving and isolated in H except for U S , then eventually every object in UH is in a stable heap
supported by some subset of U S .
(The above axioms are formalized as axioms H.1, H.2, and H.3 in Table 19.)
12 There is an important and awkward exception to this. If the agent is “trying” to move a grasped object O1 in a given direction but that motion is
blocked by a mobile object O2 that is “stuck”, then moving O2 may permit O1 to proceed. A major diﬃculty in formulating an existence theorem for
well-posed problems in the theory of rigid solid object dynamics with manipulators is to characterize under what circumstances and in what sense a
speciﬁed manipulation constitutes a valid boundary condition.
13 We assume throughout that there are only ﬁnitely many objects in the universe; hence all such sequences are ﬁnite.
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3.7. No upward motion
Finally, we formulate the default rule that will allow us to infer that cargo objects do not come out of the top of the
box. We want to state that by default objects in the box do not move upward with respect to the box; more generally, that
objects in a heap by default do not move upward with respect to the supports of the heap. There can be different possible
deﬁnitions of what is meant by object O “moving upward”; for convenience we will interpret this as meaning that the
center of mass of O moves upward and we axiomatize the center of mass as some point within the convex hull of O . (If
the region occupied by O is known, but the density distribution is entirely unknown, then all that can be said about O ’s
center of mass is that it is in O ’s convex hull.)
Let us begin by formulating the rule in the special case where there is a single support object that maintains a constant
vertical axis.
Preliminary Deﬁnition 3.7.1. In state S1, let O be an object in heap UH that is supported by a singleton object set {O S}.
Let H be a history with starting state S1. Assume that O S maintains a constant vertical during H (that is, O S may translate
and may rotate around the zˆ axis, but it may not undergo a rotation that tilts the zˆ axis; it may yaw but not pitch or roll.)
Let Q S be any point in O S and let Q C be the center of mass of O . O moves upward relative to O S in H if height(Q C )–
height(Q S) is larger at the end of H than at the beginning of H . (Since O S maintains a constant vertical, if this is true for
any point Q S in O S , it is true for all points in O S .) O has an anomalous upward motion in H if UH is free-moving and
isolated from all objects except O S in H and O moves upward relative to O S in H .
A history is upward motion free if, for every subhistory H1 of H , no object has an anomalous upward motion in H1.
Default Rule 3.7.2. By default, any physically possible history is upward motion free.
We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.7.3. In state S, let O B be a box with opening Q T , let U H be a heap of objects supported by O B, and let O be an object in
U H. Let F be the diameter of O , and let D be the vertical gap between Q T and the center of mass of O . Let H be a physically possible
history starting in S. Assume that throughout H, U H is free moving and isolated from all objects except O B, and that O B maintains
a constant vertical, though it may be moved and rotated around the z-axis. Assume that D > F . Then by default O remain in O B
throughout H.
Sketch of proof. By default, H is upward motion free. Suppose that O goes out of the box during H . As argued in Section 3.5
above, if O goes out of the box, it must go through the opening at the top. Therefore, each point in O must be at the top
at some point during H . Therefore at some time T2 during H , the center of mass of O must be closer to the top of O B it
was at the start, so the center of mass of O has moved upward relative to O B in the subhistory of H that starts in S and
ends at T2; but this contradicts the statement that H is upward motion free. 
To complete the proof, it is necessary to establish that the default conclusion is consistent, but it is easy to construct
scenarios which are demonstrably consistent with the above givens, with Newtonian physics, and with all the axioms we
shall state in Section 4 below, in which the objects in UH rest motionless at the bottom of O B throughout H . UH is a
stable pile at the bottom of O B which demonstrably does not move relative to O B during all of H .
We next need to generalize the above rule in two respects. First, a heap may be supported by more than one support
object. Second, the support object O S may rotate its vertical axis. In that case, even if the heap just sits quietly on top of
the support, still the center of mass of some of the objects may move upward with respect to some of the points in O S .
Indeed, if the center of mass of some object O in the heap does not lie above the convex hull of the horizontal projection
of O S , then the center of mass of O may move upward with respect to every point in the support O S (Fig. 9).
As discussed above, in formulating our default rule, we try to keep it as restricted as possible, to lessen the likelihood of
weird consequences. We therefore address the above two cases as follows. First, we consider an object in a heap as moving
upward with respect to its supports only if it moves upward with respect to all its supports. Second, we deal with the
problem of a support O S that rotates vertically as follows: For any history H , imagine taking a video of the behavior of the
supports and the heaps during H . At any point during the video, you can take a vertical arrow and attach it to O S through
any point in O S . Now replay the video from the beginning with that added arrow ﬁxed to O S , so that it moves and rotates
along with O S . We say that the heap object O moves upward with respect to O S in H if the projection of the center of
mass of O onto the arrow is higher at the end of H than at the beginning of H .
Deﬁnition 3.7.4. In state S1, let O be an object in heap UH that is supported by an object set U S Let H be a history with
starting state S1. O “moves upward” with respect to U S in H if the following condition holds: For every object O S ∈ U S
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and for every coordinate system Q C “attached” to O S which is vertically aligned in some state in H , the z-coordinate in
Q C of the center of mass of O is larger at the end of H than at the beginning of H .
The deﬁnitions of “anomalous upward motion free”, and of “upward motion free” in terms of “moves upward” are the
same as in the Preliminary Deﬁnition 3.7.1, replacing “O S” by “U S”, and the Default Rule 3.7.2 remains unchanged. It can
be seen that this deals reasonably, both with objects that stay ﬁxed on the support, and with boxes. If an object stays in
a constant position on the support, then, since any of these arrows are likewise ﬁxed to the support, the projection of the
center of mass on the arrow remains constant, consistent with the default rule.
In the scenario of the heap of objects in the box, we can weaken the statement that the box maintains a constant
vertical to the constraint that the maximum deviation from the vertical is φ, if we correspondingly increase the required
gap between the top of the heap and the opening of the box.
Theorem 3.7.5. (This is the result cited in Section 3.3.3.) In state S, let O B be a box with opening Q T , let U H be a heap of objects
supported by O B, and let O be an object in U H. Let F be the diameter of O , and let D be the vertical gap between Q T and the center of
mass of O . Let G be the maximum distance between the projection onto the x–y plane of the center of mass of O the projection of any
point in the opening of the box in S. Let H be a physically possible history starting in S. Assume that throughout H, U H is free moving
and isolated from all objects except U S, and that the vertical tilt of O B is never greater than φ . Assume that D cos(φ) > G sin(φ)+ F .
Then by default O remains in O B throughout H.
Proof. It is easy to show geometrically that all of the opening is at least F higher than any of the boxes, where “height” is
measured by projection on any of the tilted arrows that can be attached during H . The proof is otherwise identical to that
of Theorem 3.7.3 above. This result is essentially Lemma 2.29 in our formal proof. 
On the other hand, if the box tips far enough over that objects that can spill out, then, relative to the arrow attached
when the box is fully tipped, an object is moving downward, so the default is not violated.
We next discuss the workings of this default rule on a number of further examples. As we will see, the default rule
does the “right thing” for Examples 1–3; in Example 4 it is not clear what the right thing should be but what the default
rule does is at least not obviously wrong; in Example 5, the default rule is certainly not giving us what we would wish for.
Throughout these examples, we will assume that the theory under discussion includes both the axioms we give below in
Section 4 and also the axioms of the Newtonian physics of solid objects. Note that adding the axioms of Newtonian physics
does not affect the inferences we have discussed above.
Example 1. Consider Fig. 10. Suppose that object OT is ﬁxed, and objects O A and O B are mobile. What will actually
happen here is that O A remains ﬁxed and O B falls down. One might think that this would be a problem for the default
rule, because by Deﬁnition 3.6.1, one can consider {O A} to be a heap with supports {OT , O B} and O A moves upward
relative to O B . However, in fact the default is not a problem here, because the default rejects a behavior only if a heap
object moves upward with respect to all its supports, and O A is not moving upward with respect to OT .
Example 2. Suppose that O A is in free fall inside box O B (Fig. 11). Then O B is not a support of any heap containing O A, so
the default does not apply. That is not a problem. If it is known that O A is initially moving downward, then we can prove
that it will eventually hit either O B itself or some other object that is (directly or indirectly) in contact with O B . At that
point O A becomes part of a heap inside O B , so we can apply the default from that point. If it is known that O A is initially
moving up, then it may well escape O B , if it is moving fast enough, so we do not want the default to apply. If the direction
of motion of O A is not initially speciﬁed, there does not seem to be any very good reason to make the default assumption
that it is not moving upward fast enough to escape, so the fact that the default rule does not apply is not a problem.
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Example 3. Suppose that O B is a box, OC is a ramp resting at the bottom of O B , and O A is on OC sliding rapidly upward.
Since {O A, OC} is a heap with support {O B}, the condition of the defaults apply. However, if our theory includes the law
of inertia, then O A must be moving upward with respect to the box, so the default is explicitly overridden, so again we get
the correct answer (Fig. 12).
Similarly if one explicitly sets up and triggers a catapult, then the axioms of Newtonian physics imply that the missile
will move upward, so the default rule is explicitly overridden.
Example 4. Suppose that object O A is inside O B but it is not speciﬁed whether it is part of a heap supported by O B or
whether it is in free fall. Then the default rule applies, and gives rise to the conclusion that either O A is initially in a heap
and remains in the box or it is initially in free fall and nothing can be said as to its motion. It is not clear to me whether
this is the most desirable conclusion, or how one would decide what is the most desirable conclusion. Things get fairly
nebulous at this level of ignorance. In any case, it seems to me that this is at least not indisputably wrong.
Example 5. Consider Fig. 13. The box is made of three jointed pieces: The ﬁrst piece O B1 consists of the left-hand wall
and the left-hand half of the ﬂoor. The second piece O B2 is the right-hand half of the ﬂoor, and the third piece O B3 is the
right-hand wall. In the starting state, object O A rests on O B1 and O B2, so these are its supports. Now consider a history
in which right-hand side of the box is folded upward and inward so that O B2 becomes vertical. Then the default rule
applies but it does not prevent O A from exiting the box, for the following reason: If you attach the vertical arrow to O B2
at the end of the history, then that arrow is lying horizontally in the starting state, and therefore a motion of O A vertically
upward would not be upward with respect to the arrow at that point. Therefore, such a motion would not be anomalous,
and would be consistent with the statement that the history is upward motion free.
This example is unequivocally a failing of our theory; in this case, we deﬁnitely want to predict that O A does not exit
the box, and our default rule is not strong enough to support that. This strongly suggests that we have not found the best
possible formulation of the default rule, in the case of multiple supports with vertical rotations. It should be noted, though,
that this is at least the right direction for failure; it is much better to have the default rule be too weak than too strong.
Finally, we need to specify a particular default logic in which the default rule can be stated and applied. It seems that
Reiterian default theory [31] ﬁts our needs better than circumscription [24]. Let me explain in terms of the standard example
of birds that can ﬂy. Suppose we have the following four ﬁrst-order statements:
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1. ∀X penguin(X ) ⇒ ¬canFly(X ).
2. ∀X penguin(X ) ⇒ bird(X ).
3. ∃X penguin(X ).
4. bird(tweety).
We also have the default rule, “By default, birds can ﬂy”, and we would like to infer that Tweety can ﬂy.
In the Reiterian theory, this default can be represented by the rule
5.R. bird(X ) : canFly(X ) / canFly(X ).
The theory 1–4, 5.R supports the conclusion “canFly(tweety)” and therefore, from (1), ¬penguin(tweety).
But there is no way to get this out of circumscription. The default rule is represented by the ﬁrst-order statement
5.C. bird(X) ∧ ¬ab(X ) ⇒ canFly(X )
and the circumscriptive policy of minimizing the predicate “ab”. But this does not support the conclusion canFly(tweety),
whether or not the extension of “penguin” is allowed to vary, because a model where Tweety is the only penguin and the
only abnormal entity does, in fact, minimize ab.
If you replace (3) above with “penguin(fred)”, add the unique names assumption that tweety =fred, and adopt the
circumscriptive policy of minimizing “ab” while allowing “penguin” to vary, then you can indeed deduce that Tweety can
ﬂy. But you can also deduce that Fred is the only penguin. This seems like a lot of bath water to hold onto for the sake of
not losing the baby.
Going back to boxes: “canFly(X )” corresponds to “X comes out of the box”, “bird(X )” corresponds to “X is in a heap
on the ﬂoor of the box” and “penguin(X )” corresponds to “X is a missile being catapulted”. The existential statement
(3) corresponds to the fact that a complete theory of solid object dynamics should certainly support the inference that
it is possible to set up and ﬁre catapults. The impossibility of showing circumscriptively that Tweety is not a penguin
corresponds to the impossibility of showing that the agent has not set up a catapult, given that he has loaded some objects
into the box.
Therefore, it seems to me that, despite the attractiveness of circumscription — it is usually much easier to verify the
correctness of proofs in circumscription than in Reiterian default theory — it is not applicable here. The same considerations
apply to the default rule that we use to prove that the box will not fall over during loading.
4. The formal theory
We now proceed to encode the above theory in logical form. This is actually reasonably straightforward; except for
the semantics of plans, we have covered all of the tricky issues already. Other than the two default rules H.5 and UP.1,
deﬁned below, we represent all of our theory in ﬁrst-order logic. In this section we ﬁrst establish a few basics: notational
conventions and system of sorts (Section 4.1), and theories of real arithmetic and of Boolean operations on ﬁnite sets
of objects (4.2). We will then describe the ontology, language, and theories that we will use for theories of time (4.3),
space (4.4), motion (4.5), and physics (4.6). Section 4.7 presents a comprehension axiom for histories. Section 4.8 gives the
semantics of our language of plans. Finally we give the speciﬁcation of the problem to be solved (4.9) and the speciﬁcation
of the plan that solves it (4.10).
We assume the standard mathematical theories of integer and real arithmetic, Boolean operators on ﬁnite sets, Euclidean
geometry, and continuous functions. Therefore, in our axiomatization, we will enumerate the sorts and symbols we need,
but we will not list the axioms. In our formal proof, we cite theorems from these theories as needed without axiomatic
proofs (though when the theorems are not obvious, we give proofs in the usual sense).
The axioms we enumerate are, for the most part, just those we need for the validation of the plan; we have not at-
tempted anything like a complete axiomatization of these domains.
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Axioms of sorts.
SORT.1 The declaration of predicate symbol α as taking arguments of sorts σ1 . . . σk corresponds to the axiom
∀X1 ...Xkα(X1 . . . Xk) ⇒ sortOf(X1, σ1) ∧· · ·∧ sortOf(Xk, σk).
(Note: The equality symbol X = Y has no sort declaration, so this axiom does not apply.)
SORT.2 The declaration of function symbol β as taking arguments of sorts σ1 . . . σk and returning a value
of sort σ0 corresponds to the two axioms ∀X0,X1 ...Xk X0 = β(X1 . . . Xk) = ⊥ ⇒
sortOf(X1, σ1) ∧ · · · ∧ sortOf(Xk, σk) ∧ sortOf(X0, σ0)
and
∀X0,X1 ...Xk sortOf(X1, σ1) ∧ · · · ∧ sortOf(Xk, σk) ⇒ β(X1 . . . Xk) = ⊥.
SORT.3 The declaration of constant symbol γ as having sort σ corresponds to the axiom sortOf(γ ,σ ).
SORT.4 ∀S ¬sortOf(⊥, S).
(The null element has no sort.)
SORT.5 subsort(S1, S2) ≡ ∀X sortOf(X, S1) ⇒ sortOf(X, S2).
(Deﬁnition of subsort.)
4.1. Notational conventions
All this is pretty much standard and self-explanatory, but it is as well to lay it out systematically.
Our axioms are stated in a sorted ﬁrst-order logic. We use symbols in Roman font beginning with a lower-case letter,
such as “openBox”, for function and predicate symbols, and symbols in typewriter font, such as oBox, for constant symbols.
We use upper case symbols in italics for variables. Standard mathematical functions and predicates are used in the standard
way; e.g. X1 + X2 is an inﬁx function; the pair of curly brackets of {E1, E2} is an outﬁx function (mapping E1 and E2
to the set {E1, E2}). To aid readability, the sort of a variable is indicated by the ﬁrst letter; however, all axioms are stated
so that this convention is not necessary. Quantiﬁed variables are subscripted to their quantiﬁer. For brevity, we use two
forms of restricted quantiﬁcation in the subscript: a variable may be restricted by sort or by membership in a set. Logical
operators follow the following precedence, from highest to lowest: negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, implication
⇒, equivalence ⇔, deﬁnitional equivalence ≡, and quantiﬁers ∀ and ∃. Thus, the scope of a quantiﬁer is to the end of the
formula or to a right bracket that contains it. Free variables are taken to be universally quantiﬁed, where the scope of the
implicit quantiﬁer is the entire formula. Greek letters are infrequently used as meta-variables.
We have a hierarchical system of sorts, which is interpreted as syntactic sugar for a standard ﬁrst-order theory with a
null element ⊥. (The null element is never used explicitly in our formulas.) In the translation to the base theory, an individ-
ual sort such as “object” or “state” is considered an entity. There are two predicates over sorts: “sortOf(X, S)”, meaning that
X is an entity of sort S , and “subsort(S1, S2)”, meaning that S1 is a subsort of S2. We will abuse notation in our formulas
by writing “S(X)” where S is a sort instead of “sortOf(X, S)”; e.g. we will write “object(O )” instead of “sortOf(X ,object)”.
The sorts of the arguments to predicate and function symbols and to the values of function and constant symbols will be
declared in a self-explanatory notation when these symbols are deﬁned. Table 2 shows the translation of sort declarations
into the base language.
As axiom SORT.2 indicates, all functions are required to be total over the sort on which they are deﬁned (except for
numerical division, which is grandfathered). Hence, when we have a mapping which is single-valued but not total, we will
use a relation symbol for it and add an axioms stating that it is single valued (when necessary). The “value” of the mapping
will conventionally be the last argument. For this reason, in cases where we do use a function symbol, even if that is deﬁned
and not primitive, such as “startTime( J )” in Section 4.3 below, we do not have to add an axiom stating that the function is
total over the sort; such an axiom is implicit from the use of the function symbol.
Axioms SORT.1–SORT.4 together imply that any ground term with argument ⊥ evaluates to ⊥ and that any ground
atomic formula with argument ⊥ is false, unless the predicate is the equals sign.
4.2. Real arithmetic; set theory
As stated above, we use real arithmetic and Boolean set theory over sets of elements. (As we shall see below, the sets that
we need in this paper are sets of objects, and sets of geometric points; these two sorts are therefore deﬁnes as subsorts of
“element”.) Table 3 enumerates the sorts and the symbols used. All the symbols are entirely standard, except “count(U , I)”,
a predicate meaning that integer I is the number of elements in ﬁnite set U (if U is inﬁnite, then this does not hold for
any I). The letter after the sort is the one we will use to indicate variables of that sort.
4.3. Time
Our temporal theory in some respects resembles the phase-space theory of physics (and inherited by robotics from
physics) rather than the situation-based theory more common in AI [32,27]. Speciﬁcally, for our purposes the state of the
world at an instant can be characterized by the values of a ﬁxed class of ﬂuents. The history of the world is a function
from real-valued time to states. A state may persist unchanged over a ﬁnite length of time, or a history may “return” to a
previous state; whereas the model of situations is generally taken to be strictly forward-branching with no cycles. In our
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Sorts and symbols for real arithmetic and set theory.
Sorts:
Real numbers (X).
Integers (I). Subsort of reals.
Elements (E).
Sets of elements (U ).
Symbols:
X1+ X2, X1− X2, X1 · X2, X1/X2, X, min(X1, X2), X1< X2, X1 X2, π .
∅, {E1, E2 . . . Ek}, E ∈ U , U1∪ U2, U1∩ U2, U1⊂ U2, U1− U2.
count(U : set, I: integer).
model an action A is feasible in state S if there exists a history starting in S in which A occurs; whereas most models
of situation calculus theories have explicitly forward-branching structures. Therefore, we will use the word “state” rather
“situation” to denote a snapshot of the universe at an instant.
For brevity, we will treat clocktimes (e.g. May 1, 2006 12:45:00 PM) and durations (e.g. 1.57 hour) as real numbers,
though of course a more rigorous treatment would take these to be separate sorts which have a real-valued measure in
a given temporal coordinate system. For readability, we will use T for variables over clocktimes and D for variables over
durations.
The other temporal sorts we will use are as follows:
• A state is a snapshot of the universe.
• A ﬂuent is an entity that takes on different values in different states. A Boolean ﬂuent such as “grasping(O )” (the agent is
grasping object O ) is true or false in a state; a non-Boolean ﬂuent such as “place(O )” (the region occupied by object O )
takes on values of some other sort. If a ﬂuent Q takes on values of sort σ , we denote the sort of Q as “ﬂuent[σ ]”;
e.g. grasping(O ) has sort ﬂuent[Bool] and place(O ) has sort ﬂuent[region]. In translating the sort language to the base
language, the symbol “ﬂuent” here is a function that maps a sort like “region” to the sort ﬂuent[region].
• A history is a function from a closed interval of clocktimes to states.14
• Because we are using a language of plans that includes loops, which can be inﬁnite loops, it is sometimes necessary
to allow histories that are closed on the left but unbounded on the right. These are also convenient for stating that a
certain condition is eventually attained. A uhistory is a function to states whose domain is an interval of clocktimes that
is closed on the left and either closed or unbounded on the right. Thus, histories are a subsort of uhistories.
Tables 4–7 enumerate the temporal symbols, deﬁnitions, and axioms we use. The temporal theory actually requires only
three primitives (in addition to the primitives on the reals): holds(S, Q ), value(S, Q ), and stateAt( J , T , S). However, it is
useful to have a large vocabulary of deﬁned predicates as convenient abbreviations.
It will also be convenient to deﬁne some additional syntactic conventions for constructing functions over ﬂuents from
functions and predicates over atemporal entities. First, if X is an atemporal entity, then we deﬁne value(S, X) = X for all
states S; that is, we conﬂate a ﬂuent that are constant with its value.
Let Φ(X1 : σ1 . . . Xk : σk) be a predicate (or equality sign) over atemporal sorts σ1 . . . σk . For i = 1 . . .k let Q i be a ﬂuent
of sort ﬂuent[σi]. Then we deﬁne Φ#(Q 1 . . . Qk) to be the Boolean ﬂuent satisfying
∀S:state holds
(
S,Φ#(Q 1 . . . Qk)
)⇔ Φ(value(S, Q 1) . . .value(S, Qk)).
Similarly let Ψ (X1 . . . Xk) : σ be a function with arguments of atemporal sorts σ1 . . . σk and value of sort σ . Then
Ψ #(Q 1 . . . Qk) is the ﬂuent of sort ﬂuent[σ ] satisfying
∀S:state value
(
S,Ψ #(Q 1 . . . Qk)
)= Ψ (value(S, Q 1) . . .value(S, Qk)).
Finally, if  is a Boolean operator then # is the corresponding function over Boolean ﬂuents (used with the same syntax
as the operator). That is,
∀T :time holds
(
T , Q 1#Q 2
)⇔ [holds(T , Q 1)holds(T , Q 2)].
For example, if Q 1 and Q 2 are ﬂuents whose value at each time is a set, then “Q 1 =# ∅” is the Boolean ﬂuent that holds
at those times where Q 1 is empty. “Q 1⊂# Q 2” is the Boolean ﬂuent that holds when Q 1 is a subset of Q 2. “Q 1∪# Q 2”
is the ﬂuent whose value at each time S is the union of the values of Q 1 and Q 2. “Q 1⊂# Q 2 ∨# Q 2⊂# Q 1” is the ﬂuent
that holds at all times in which either Q 1 is a subset of Q 2 or Q 2 is a subset of Q 1.
14 Some of the axioms below, particularly DYN.12, HC.4, PLD.3, PLD.5, and PLD.7 could be stated more elegantly if we allowed the use of bounded, open
intervals as well. It is not clear whether the theory would be simpler overall.
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Time: Sorts and symbols.
Sorts:
Time (T ) = real.
Duration (D) = real.
State (S).
Fluent(Q ).
History (H).
Uhistory ( J ).
Symbols:
holds(S: state, Q : ﬂuent[Bool]). Boolean ﬂuent Q holds in state S .
value(S: state, Q : ﬂuent[γ ]) → γ . The value of non-Boolean ﬂuent Q in state S .
γ is a meta-variable ranging over sorts.
stateAt( J : uhistory, T : time, S: state). S is the state of J at time T .
timeIn(T : time, J : uhistory). T is a time in the domain of uhistory J .
startTime( J : uhistory) → time. The starting time of uhistory J .
endTime(H: history) → time. The ending time of history H .
start( J : uhistory) → state. The starting state of uhistory J .
end(H: history) → state. The ending state of history J .
unbounded( J : uhistory).
Uhistory J is unbounded on the right (i.e. not a proper history).
stateOf(S: state, J : uhistory). S is a state attained by uhistory J .
throughout( J : uhistory, Q : ﬂuent[Bool]).
Boolean ﬂuent Q holds throughout uhistory J .
throughoutxSE( J : uhistory, Q : ﬂuent[Bool]).
Q holds throughout uhistory J , except possibly at the start and end of J .
historySlice( J1, J2: uhistory). J1 is a temporal slice of J2.
historyPreﬁx( J1, J2: uhistory). J1 is a temporal preﬁx of J2.
historyProperPreﬁx(H1:history, J2: uhistory). H1 is a proper preﬁx of J2.
historySuﬃx( J1, J2: uhistory). J1 is a suﬃx of J2.
hsplice(H1: history, J2, J : uhistory).
J is the result of splicing J2 to the end of H1.
sameTime( J1, J2: uhistory). J1 and J2 have the same clocktime interval as domain.
singleHist(S: state, H: history). H is a history consisting of a single instant at S .
Table 5
Temporal theory: Deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions: These deﬁnitions are self-explanatory given the descriptions in Table 4.
TD.1 timeIn(T , J ) ≡ ∃S stateAt( J , T , S).
TD.2 T = startTime( J ) ≡
timeIn(T , J ) ∧ [∀T1 timeIn(T1, J ) ⇒ T  T1].
TD.3 history( J ) ≡
∃T1∀T2 timeIn(T2, J ) ⇒ T2 < T1.
TD.4 T = endTime(H) ≡
timeIn(T , H) ∧ [∀T1 timeIn(T1, J ) ⇒ T1 T ].
TD.5 unbounded( J ) ≡ uhistory( J ) ∧ ¬history( J ).
TD.6 S = start( J ) ≡ stateAt( J ,startTime( J ),S).
TD.7 S = end(H) ≡ history(H) ∧ stateAt(H ,endTime(H),S).
TD.8 stateOf(S, J ) ≡ ∃T stateAt( J , T , S).
TD.10 throughout( J , Q ) ≡ ∀S stateOf(S, J ) ⇒ holds(S, Q ).
4.4. Space
The ontology we use for space is Euclidean geometry (3). The spatial language is constructed entirely ad hoc. That is,
Table 8 enumerates the sorts and the predicates that we use in the physical axioms of Section 4.6 and in the problem
statement of Section 4.9; it does not attempt any systematic discussion of geometric reasoning. We give here the formal
deﬁnition of the predicates “openBox”, “partlyAbove” and “altogetherAbove” but otherwise do not list any geometric axioms
or deﬁnitions, which are all standard. In our formal proof, we will cite standard or easily proved geometric theorems as
needed.
The large number of geometric sorts that we use here may startle readers who are used to more ontologically pure the-
ories such as [3], in which the only geometric sort allowed is the sort of well-behaved, fully dimensional regions. However,
it turns out that, strictly speaking, the greater ontological proﬂigacy here is illusory. As I have shown in [9], if you have a
ﬁrst-order language that allows quantiﬁcation over regions, then even if you restrict the language to the single predicate
“closer(X, Y , Z )”, meaning “region X is closer to Y than to Z ” and you restrict the universe of entities to include only simple
polygons, nonetheless all of these ontological categories and the whole range of standard geometric concepts can be deﬁned
as ﬁrst-order constructions in this language.
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Temporal theory: More deﬁnitions.
TD.11 throughoutxSE( J , Q ) ≡
∀T timeIn(T , J ) ∧ stateAt( J , T , S) ∧ startTime( J ) < T∧
[unbounded( J ) ∨ T < endTime( J )] ⇒
holds(S, Q ).
TD.12 historySlice( J A, J B) ≡
∀T timeIn(T , J A) ⇒
[timeIn(T , J B) ∧ ∀S stateAt( J A, T , S) ⇔ stateAt( J B, T , S)].
TD.13 hSlice( J , T1, T2, H) ≡
historySlice(H, T ) ∧ startTime(H) = T1 ∧ endTime(H) = T2.
TD.14 historyPreﬁx( J A, J B) ≡
historySlice( J A, J B) ∧ startTime( J A) = startTime( J B).
TD.15 historyProperPreﬁx(H A, J B) ≡
historyPreﬁx(H A, J B) ∧ [¬unbounded( J B) ⇒ endTime(H A) < endTime( J B)].
TD.16 historySuﬃx( J A, J B) ≡
historySlice( J A, J B) ∧
[[unbounded( J A) ∧ unbounded( J B)] ∨ endTime( J A) = endTime( J B)].
TD.17 hsplice(H1, J2, J ) ⇔
historySlice(H1, J ) ∧ historySlice( J2, J ) ∧ startTime( J2) = endTime(H1).
TD.18 sameTime( J1, J2) ≡ ∀T [timeIn(T , J1) ⇔ timeIn(T , J2)].
TD.19 singleHist(H, S) ≡ startTime(H) = endTime(H) ∧ S = start(H).
Table 7
Temporal theory: Proper axioms.
T.1 timeIn(T , J ) ⇒ ∃1S stateAt( J , T , S).
(A history J has only one state S at a given time T .)
T.2 ∀T , J timeIn(T , J ) ⇔
startTime( J ) T∧ [unbounded( J ) ∨ T endTime( J )].
(A history J has a state for every time T between its start time and end time.
An unbounded uhistory has a state for every time after its start time.)
T.3 ∀S,T ∃H singleHist(H, S) ∧ startTime(H) = T .
(One can construct an instantaneous history corresponding to any state S .)
T.4 ∀ J ,T1,T2 timeIn(T1, J ) ∧ timeIn(T2, J ) ∧ T1 T2 ⇒
∃H historySlice(H, J ) ∧ startTime(H) = T1∧ endTime(H) = T2.
(One can slice history J at any times T1, T2 within the scope of J ).
T.5 ∀H1,H2 end(H1) = start(H2) ∧ endTime(H1) = startTime(H2) ⇒
∃H hsplice(H1, H2, H).
(Any two histories that meet properly can be spliced together.)
Because of the large number of geometric sorts, we are less systematic about the use of initial letters to indicate sort of
variables. In most cases, variables of sort “region” start with R; points start with P ; pointSets start with P S; rigid mappings
start with M; distances start with D (the ambiguity with durations should not cause problems); coordinate systems start
with C ; other geometric variables start with G .
A coordinate system is a standard three-dimensional orthogonal right-handed coordinate system. We assume a ﬁxed unit
of length for all coordinate systems. Different coordinate systems may differ in orientation and in the choice of origin.
A region is a spatial region that could be the shape of a physical object. We posit that a region is topologically regular
(i.e. equal to the closure of its interior), bounded, and connected.
A rigid mapping is a positive, orthonormal mapping of three-dimensional space to itself; that is, the composition of a
rotation and a translation. (Reﬂections are not allowed.)
The other geometric sorts are self-explanatory.
We use some of the RCC [30] topological relations between regions. However, since our vocabulary of symbols is so
large, we preface the name with “rcc”. Thus, the predicate “rccC(R1, R2)” is the relation usually designated “C(R1, R2)” in
the qualitative spatial reasoning literature; namely, regions R1 and R2 are connected. Similarly “rccEC(R1, R2)” is the QSR
relation EC(R1, R2), R1 and R2 are externally connected; “rccDC(R1, R2)” is the QSR relation DC(R1, R2), R1 and R2 are
disconnected; “rccDR(R1, R2)” is the QSR relation DR(R1, R2), R1 and R2 are disjoint (either disconnected or externally
connected); and “rccO(R1, R2)” is the QSR relation O(R1, R2), R1 and R2 overlap. The RCC relations are only applied to
regions, not to other point sets.
The function “mappingImage(M,G)” denotes the image of G under rigid mapping M . The sort of mappingImage(M,G) is
the same as the sort of G (in other words, all our geometric sorts are closed under rigid mappings).
The predicate “diameter(P S, X )” means that X is the diameter of point set P S; that is, the least upper bound on
distance(P1, P2) where P1, P2 are points in P S . If P S is unbounded, then this does not hold for any X .
The predicate “altogetherAbove(P S1, P S2)” means that every point in P S1 is above some point in P S2; and no point in
P S2 is above any point in P S1 (Table 9).
The predicate “partlyAbove(P S1, P S2)” means that some point in P S1 is above some point in P S1.
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Spatial sorts and symbols.
Sorts:
distance (D) = real.
angle = real.
geomEntity (G).
Any geometric entity. This is a supersort of all the sorts enumerated below.
point (P ). Subsort of element.
pointSet (P S). Any set of points. Subsort of set.
vector.
coordinateSystem.
region (R). Subsort of pointSet.
rigidMapping (M).
Symbols:
rccC(R1, R2: region).
rccEC(R1, R2: region).
rccDC(R1, R2: region).
rccDR(R1, R2: region).
rccO(R1, R2: region).
mappingImage(M: rigidMapping, G: geomEntity) → geomEntity.
The image of G under M .
boundary(R: region) → pointSet. The boundary surface of R (R-interior(R)).
planar(P S: pointSet). P S lies in a plane.
openBox(RB, R I: region, P S: pointSet).
RB is a box with inside R I and opening P S (Section 3.5).
diameter(R: region) → distance.
zˆ: vector. The absolute upward direction.
zAxis(GC : coordinateSystem) → vector. The z axis of coordinate system GC .
zCoor(P : point, GC : coordinateSystem) → real. The z-coordinate of P in GC .
disk(P S: pointSet). P S is a two-dimensional solid disk.
convexHull(P S: pointSet) → pointSet.
pointAbove(P1, P2: point). P1 is vertically above P2.
partlyAbove(P S1, P S2: pointSet).
altogetherAbove(P S1, P S2: pointSet).
height(P : point) → distance.
top(R: region) → distance. D is the maximum value of height(P ) for P ∈ R .
bottom(R: region) → distance. D is the minimum value of height(P ) for P ∈ R .
xyProj(P S: pointSet) → pointSet.
cuboid(R: region, L, D, H: distance).
verticalTilt(M1,M2: rigidMapping) → real.
cos(R: real) → real.
sin(R: real) → real.
Table 9
A few spatial deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions:
SD.1 openBox(RB, R I, P S) ≡
rccEC(RB, R I) ∧ P S = boundary(R I) − boundary(RB) ∧ planar(P S)∧
∃P SD P SD ⊂ P S ∧ disk(P SD).
SD.2 partlyAbove(P S1, P S2) ≡
∃P1,P2 pointIn(P1, P S1) ∧ pointIn(P2, P S2) ∧ pointAbove(P1, P2).
SD.3 altogetherAbove(P S1, P S2) ≡
¬partlyAbove(P S2, P S1) ∧ ∀P1∈P S1 ∃P2∈P S2 pointAbove(P1, P2).
It is useful to posit a standard coordinate system, with a vertical z-axis. The function “height(P )” is the height of point
P in the standard coordinate system. The function “xyProj(P S)” is the projection of point set P S in the standard coordinate
system. The predicate “cuboid(R, L, D, H)” means that region R is a cuboid with length L, depth D , and height H (L and D
need not be aligned with the standard coordinate axes).
The meanings of the remaining symbols in Table 8 are obvious. Functions and predicates deﬁned over point sets are
overloaded to apply to individual points by coercing the point P to the point set {P }.
The function “verticalTilt(M1,M2)” (used in axiom P1.17, Section 4.10) is the angle between the vertical direction
zˆ and the direction M2(M
−1
1 (zˆ)). The signiﬁcance is as follows: Suppose that Q V is a pseudo-object vector with
source O . Let M1 = value(S1,placement(O )) and let M2 = value(S2,placement(O )). If Q V points upward in S1, then
verticalTilt(M1,M2) is the co-latitude of Q V in S2 (that is, the angle between the direction of Q V in S2 and the vertical
axis).
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Kinematics: Symbols.
Sorts:
object (O ).
pseudo.
gObject (Q ). Supersort of object and pseudo.
objectSet (U ). Set of objects.
Symbols:
source(O : gObject) → object.
shape(Q : gObject) → geomEntity.
placement(Q : gObject) → ﬂuent[rigidMapping].
place(Q : gObject) → ﬂuent[geomEntity].
motionless( J : uhistory, O : object).
ﬁxed(O : object).
mobile(O : object).
objectsOf(S: state) → objectSet.
objectsOf( J : uhistory) → objectSet.
(For readability, we overload the function “objectsOf”.)
kinematicState → ﬂuent[Bool].
kinematic( J : uhistory).
empty(R: region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
mappingDistance(M1,M2: rigidMapping; P : point).
Table 11
Kinematics: Deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions:
KD.1 value(S ,place(Q )) = mappingImage(value(S ,placement(Q )),shape(Q )).
KD.2 motionless( J , O ) ≡
∀S stateOf(S, J ) ⇒ value(S1,placement(O )) = value(start( J ),placement(O )).
KD.3 mobile(O ) ≡ ¬ﬁxed(O ).
KD.4 holds(S ,kinematicState) ⇔
∀O1,O2∈objectsOf(S) holds(S ,rccDR#(↑ O1,↑ O2)).
KD.5 kinematic( J ) ≡
throughout( J ,kinematicState) ∧ ∀O∈objectsOf( J) ﬁxed(O ) ⇒ motionless(H, O ).
KD.6 holds(S ,empty(R)) ⇔ ∀O∈objectsOf(S) holds(S ,rccDR#(↑ O , R)).
KD.7 mappingDistance(M1,M2, P ) = distance(mappingImage(M1, P ),mappingImage(M2, P )).
4.5. Kinematic theory of objects in motion
We can now formulate the kinematic theory of rigid objects in motion (Tables 10–12). We introduce three new sorts.
An object is a rigid solid object. We assume that all objects are disjoint; we do not allow one object to be part of another.
A pseudo-object [6] is a geometric entity that “moves around” with an object, such as the center of mass of an object, the
hole of a donut, the apex of a cone, and so on. The source of pseudo-object Q is the object to which Q is “attached”.
A generalized object (gObject) is a supersort that includes both objects and pseudo-objects.
We characterize an object O and its associated pseudo-objects in terms of an arbitrary standard position. The shape of O
is the region that it occupies in its standard position. The shape of pseudo-object Q is the geometric entity that instantiates
Q when O is in its standard position.
Any two possible positions of a rigid object O are related by a rigid mapping; that is, a combination of a translation
and a rotation. For any object O and state S , we deﬁne the placement of O in S , denoted value(S ,placement(O )), as the
rigid mapping from the standard position to the position in S . The sort of placement(O ) is thus ﬂuent[rigidMapping].
The region occupied by O in state S is the image of shape(O ) under the mapping value(S ,placement(O )); this is denoted
value(S ,place(O )) (deﬁnition KD.1). The same holds for pseudo-objects; for any state S and pseudo-object Q , the place of
Q in S is the image under a rigid mapping of the shape(Q ). By constraining this rigid mapping to be the placement in S of
the source of Q (axiom K.2), we enforce the condition that the pseudo-object “moves together” with the associated object.
Since the function place(O ) is used so frequently in our theory, we abbreviate it using the symbol ↑ O . For example,
the formula, “holds(S ,rccEC#(↑ O1,↑ O2))” is an abbreviation for “holds(S ,rccEC#(place(O1), place(O2)))”, meaning that
O1 and O2 are externally connected in state S . Also, by convention, we extend any geometric predicate Φ to objects and
pseudo-objects by deﬁning Φ(Q 1 . . . Qk) = Φ(shape(Q 1) . . . shape(Qk)). For instance, if O is an object, then “cuboid(O )” is
equivalent to “cuboid(shape(O ))”.
A state S is kinematic if no two objects occupy overlapping regions in S . A history H is kinematic if all states in H are
kinematic and all ﬁxed objects are motionless. We do not posit that all histories are kinematic, because for some purposes
it is useful to contemplate hypothetical histories that are not kinematic. For instance, the easiest way to deﬁne an impact
between two objects is to assert that, if the objects continued with the same velocities, they would interpenetrate; and the
easiest way to express that contrary-to-fact conditional is in terms of a hypothetical, non-kinematic history in which the
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Kinematic theory: Axioms.
Axioms:
K.1 object(O ) ⇒ source(O ) = O .
K.2 ∀Q placement(Q ) = placement(source(Q )).
K.3 object(O ) ⇒ region(shape(O )).
K.4 stateAt( J , T , S) ⇒ objectsOf( J ) = objectsOf(S).
K.5 ∀DE:distance,P :point, J ,O ,T1,S1
O ∈ objectsOf( J )∧ stateAt( J , T1, S1) ∧ 0 < DE ⇒
∃DD:duration 0 < DD ∧
∀T2,S2 T1− DD < T2 < T1+ DD ∧ stateAt( J , T2, S2) ⇒
mappingDistance(value(S1,placement(O )),
value(S2,placement(O )),P )
< DE .
(Every object O moves continuously in every history J . This is the usual  − δ
deﬁnition of continuity. DE is , DD is δ.)
Table 13
Axioms of grasping.
Symbols:
freeGrasp → ﬂuent[Bool].
grasping(O : object) → ﬂuent[Bool].
Deﬁnition:
GD.1 holds(S ,freeGrasp) ⇔ ¬∃O holds(S ,grasping(O )).
Axioms:
G.1 holds(S ,grasping(O1)) ∧ holds(S ,grasping(O2)) ⇒ O1= O2.
(The agent grasps at most one object at a time.)
G.2 holds(S,grasping(O )) ⇒ O ∈ objectsOf(S).
two objects do continue with the same velocity and do interpenetrate. (In Lemma 2.13 of our formal proof, we actually do
use such hypothetical histories to simplify the proof.)
We do posit (axiom K.5 below) that objects move continuously in every history; we have not found any use for discon-
tinuous histories.
4.6. Physical theory
We now turn to the physical theory, which is new in this paper. (The previous theories are not.) Here we axiomatize
some of the properties of dynamic histories; that is, histories that obey the laws of the dynamics of solid objects. However,
unlike kinematic histories, we do not give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a history to be dynamic.
We divide this section into four parts: The theory of grasping (Section 4.6.1), general characteristics of dynamic histo-
ries (Section 4.6.2), the theory of stable heaps (Section 4.6.3), and the default rule prohibiting anomalous upward motion
(Section 4.6.4).
4.6.1. Grasping
As described in Section 3.1, we use a very rudimentary theory of grasping in this paper (Table 13). The agent can grasp
one object at a time, or may not be grasping anything.
It will be convenient, for technical reasons, to assume that any state of grasping takes place over an open time interval.
This can be related to a more realistic theory of manipulators if we deﬁne “grasping” to mean that the manipulators are
exerting a positive force on the object; if the force is a continuous function of time, then it will be greater than zero over
an open time interval.15 However, though this deﬁnition works well in straightforward cases, it may break down in more
complicated cases; for instance if the agent tries to ungrasp an object when it is not otherwise stably supported. In such
cases, the idealization that there is a simple Boolean ﬂuent “grasping” does not apply.
4.6.2. Dynamic histories
In this section we describe some general axioms that govern dynamic histories. We introduce the predicate “dynamic( J )”
meaning that history J obeys the laws of the dynamic theories of rigid solid objects (Tables 14, 15). We do not attempt
to characterize necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this, but merely state those axioms that we will use in our example
here.
15 Extending this idea, an alternative approach to axiomatizing grasping would be to posit a continuous real-valued ﬂuent “graspForce(O )”, the grasping
force that the agent exerts on object O , and to deﬁne “grasping(O )” as holding in states where graspForce(O ) > 0. This would simplify the theory in some
respects and complicate it in others; it is not clear whether overall it would be a gain.
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Dynamics: Symbols.
Symbols:
dynamic( J : uhistory).
isolated(UH,U S: objectSet) → ﬂuent[Bool].
sameStateOn(S1, S2: state, U : objectSet).
sameStateExcept(S1, S2: state, U : objectSet).
sameHistoryOn( J1, J2: uhistory, U : objectSet).
sameMotionOn( J1, J2: uhistory, U : objectSet, D: duration).
sameUntilEnd(H1, H2: history).
coherentGrasping( J1, J2: uhistory). See deﬁnition DYD.7 and axiom DYN.9.
freeMotion(O : object) → ﬂuent[Bool].
movingThroughout(O : object, H: history).
parallelMotion(O1, O2: object, H: history).
Following our discussion in Section 3.6, we deﬁne the ﬂuent “isolated(UH,U S)”. In state S , a collection of objects UH is
isolated from all objects except U S if no object in UH is in contact with any object outside of UH ∪U S . This ﬂuent enables
us to posit that a collection of objects is free from interference from other objects without needing to impose draconian
closed-world assumptions that demand that such other objects do not exist. This boundary condition is important both in
the veriﬁcation of our plan and in the statement of physical axioms.
Another useful concept is that of two states S1 and S2 being the same on the set of objects U ; in our theory, this holds
if the positions of every object in U is the same in S1 as in S2 and object O in U is being grasped in S1 if and only if it
is being grasped in S2. The concepts of two states being the same except on the objects in U , or of two histories being the
same on the objects in U are deﬁned analogously.
Axioms DYN.1 and DYN.2 of Table 16 both state that new states or histories can be constructed from old ones by
various kinds of modiﬁcations. Axioms DYN.3–DYN.8 discuss how a dynamic histories can be constructed and modiﬁed.
Note that not all the modiﬁcation operators that apply to histories in general, or even to kinematic histories, apply to
dynamic histories. For instance the projection of a history H onto a subset of its objects is a history H1 (axiom DYN.2) and
if H is kinematic then trivially H1 is kinematic, but it is not the case that if H is dynamic then H1 is dynamic. For instance,
H may have mobile object o1 supported on ﬁxed object o2; if you project onto just o1, then o1 is ﬂoating in mid-air.
However, DYN.7 gives suﬃcient conditions under which the projection of a dynamic history is itself dynamic: if the objects
U S are all ﬁxed or grasped throughout H , and the objects UM are isolated except for U S , then the projection of H onto
the object set UM ∪ U S is dynamic.
DYN.8 is a converse, of a sort, to DYN.7. It states that if J1 and J2 are dynamic histories which are consistent in the
sense that no objects in J1 overlaps any object in J2 at any time, that any objects in common between the two are placed
in the same place, and if the agent is grasping O1 in J1, then he is not at the same time grasping O2 in J2, then one
can “play” J1 and J2 “side by side” and the combined history is itself dynamic. One might wonder whether the constraint
that no two objects overlap is not too weak; should we not have to require that no two objects from J1 and J2 come into
contact? After all, two solid objects do not have to collide to affect one another’s behavior, they merely have to come into
contact. The answer is this: Suppose that O1 follows a trajectory in J1 that comes into contact but does not overlap the
trajectory of object O2 in J2. Then the forces on O1 from the objects in J1 are suﬃcient to account for its trajectory, and
likewise for O2, so there need not be any normal force between O1 and O2 (except possibly in the end state of J , but that
has no consequences in J ). If there is no normal force, then there is no frictive force either.
Axioms DYN.10–DYN.13 (Table 17) characterize the agent’s ability to choose to grasp and ungrasp. In this representation,
the feasibility of an action is expressed as the existence of a dynamic history in which the action is carried out. This is
analogous to branching models of time, such as the situation calculus, in which the feasibility of action A in situation S is
expressed as the existence of a successor state S1 such that A transforms S into S1. In dealing with continuous time, there
are generally two cases to be considered; ﬁrst, the continuance or beginning of an action at a given time, following some
previous history; and, second, the continuance or beginning of an action immediately after a given state. Axioms DYN.10–
DYN.13 describe these two options for grasping and ungrasping. Axiom DYN.10 states that at the end of any dynamic history,
the agent can always choose to free his grasp. This is expressed by the rule that if H is a dynamic history, then there exists
another dynamic history H1 which is identical to H except that, in end(H1), the agent releases whatever he was holding
in end(H). Axiom DYN.11 states that if the agent has been grasping O throughout H up until the end, he can continue to
grasp O at the end. Axiom DYN.12 states that if the agent’s grasp is free in S then he can continue not to grasp anything
throughout some history starting in H . Axiom DYN.13 states that if the agent’s grasp is free in S or if he is grasping O in S ,
then he can grasp O in some history starting immediately after S .
In a similar way, DYN.14 gives a suﬃcient condition for the feasibility of manipulating an object O along a given tra-
jectory HK : If history HK is kinematically possible, and all the objects in HK either move parallel to object O or are
motionless, then at least an initial segment of the motion of O in HK is dynamically possible; that is, there exists a dynam-
ically possible history H2 starting in start(HK ) in which O follows the same motion as in HK . In the box example, suppose
that S is the state when all the cargo is loaded, and HK is a trajectory of carrying the box along a speciﬁed path. Then
HK would be the history in which the objects inside the box keep a ﬁxed position relative to the box and all other objects
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Dynamics: Deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions:
DYD.1 holds(S ,isolated(UH,U S)) ⇔
UH ∩ U S = ∅ ∧
∀OH∈UH,O S∈objectsOf(S) holds(S, rccC#(↑ OH,↑ O S)) ⇒ O S ∈ U S ∪ UH .
DYD.2 sameStateOn(S1, S2,U ) ≡
U ⊂objectsOf(S1) ∧ U ⊂objectsOf(S2) ∧
[∀O∈U value(S1,placement(O )) = value(S2,placement(O )) ∧
[holds(S1,grasping(O )) ⇔ holds(S2,grasping(O ))]].
DYD.3 sameStateExcept(S1, S2,U ) ≡
objectsOf(S1)−U = objectsOf(S2)−U∧ sameStateOn(S1, S2,objectsOf(S1)−U ).
DYD.4 sameHistoryOn( J1, J2,U ) ≡
sameTime( J1, J2) ∧
[∀T ,S1,S2 stateAt( J1, T , S1) ∧ stateAt( J2, T , S2) ⇒ sameStateOn(S1, S2,U )].
DYD.5 sameMotionOn( J1, J2,U , D) ≡
U ⊂objectsOf( J1) ∩ objectsOf( J2) ∧
∀T ,S1,S2,O stateAt( J1, T + D, S1) ∧ stateAt( J2, T , S2) ∧ O ∈ U ⇒
value(S1,placement(O )) = value(S2,placement(O )).
(The objects in U have the same motion in J2 as in J1 with time shift D , though not necessarily the same grasping relations.)
DYD.6 sameUntilEnd(H1, H2) ≡
sameTime(H1, H2) ∧
∀T ,S T < endTime(H1) ∧ stateAt(H1, T , S) ⇒ stateAt(H2, T , S).
DYD.7 coherentGrasping( J1, J2) ≡
∀O1,O2,T ,S1,S2 stateAt( J1, T , S1) ∧ stateAt( J1, T , S2) ∧
holds(S1,grasping(O1)) ∧ holding(S2,grasping(O2)) ⇒ O1= O2.
( J1 and J2 do not place conﬂicting conditions on what the agent is grasping at
a given time. Condition of axiom DYN.9.)
DYD.8 holds(S ,freeMotion(O )) ⇔
O ∈objectsOf(S) ∧ mobile(O ) ∧ ¬holds(S ,grasping(O )).
DYD.9 parallelMotion(O1, O2, H) ≡
∀S stateOf(S, H) ⇒
∃M:rigidMapping value(S ,placement(O1)) =
mappingImage(M ,value(start(H),placement(O1))) ∧
value(S ,placement(O2)) =
mappingImage(M ,value(start(H),placement(O2))).
Table 16
Basic properties of dynamics: Axioms (beginning).
Axioms:
DYN.1 ∀S,O ,M ∃S2 sameStateExcept(S, S2, O ) ∧M = value(S2,placement(O )).
(One can change the placement of object O in state S to M and construct a new state S2. S2 is not
necessarily kinematically possible, but it is ontologically possible.)
DYN.2 U ⊂objectsOf(H) ⇒
∃H1 objectsOf(H1) = U ∧ sameHistoryOn(H1, H,U ).
(One can project a history H onto a subset U of its objects, getting a history H1.)
DYN.3 ∀S,H kinematic(S) ∧ singleHist(H, S) ⇒ dynamic(H).
(A history H consisting of a single kinematic state S is dynamic.)
DYN.4 ∀H dynamic(H) ⇒ ∃ J unbounded( J ) ∧ dynamic( J ) ∧ historyPreﬁx(H, J ).
(Any dynamic history H can be extended to an unbounded dynamic history J .)
DYN.5 dynamic( J ) ∧ historySlice( J1, J ) ⇒ dynamic( J1).
(Any temporal slice of a dynamic history is dynamic.)
DYN.6 dynamic(H1) ∧ dynamic( J2) ∧ hsplice(H1, J2, J ) ⇒ dynamic( J ).
(If H1 and J2 are dynamic and can be spliced together to form J , then J is dynamic.
This excludes any kind of hysteresis.)
DYN.7 [dynamic( J ) ∧ throughout( J ,isolated(UM,U S)) ∧
[∀O∈U S throughout( J ,¬#freeMotion(O ))] ∧
objectsOf( J1) = UM ∪ U S ∧ sameHistoryOn( J , J1,UM ∪ U S)
] ⇒
dynamic( J1).
(Discussed in text.)
DYN.8 [dynamic( J1) ∧ dynamic( J2) ∧
objectsOf( J ) = objectsOf( J1) ∪ objectsOf( J2) ∧
sameHistoryOn( J , J1,objectsOf( J1)) ∧ sameHistoryOn( J , J2,objectsOf( J2)) ∧
kinematic( J ) ∧ coherentGrasping( J1, J2)] ⇒
dynamic( J ).
(Discussed in text.)
DYN.9 dynamic( J ) ⇒ kinematic( J ).
(A dynamic history is kinematic.)
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Basic properties of dynamics: Axioms (continued).
DYN.10 history(H) ∧ dynamic(H) ⇒
∃H1 dynamic(H1) ∧ sameUntilEnd(H, H1) ∧ holds(end(H1),freeGrasp).
DYN.11 dynamic(H) ∧ history(H) ∧ throughoutxSE(H ,grasping(O )) ⇒
∃H1 d¯ynamic(H1) ∧ sameUntilEnd(H, H1) ∧ holds(end(H1),grasping(O )).
DYN.12 holds(S ,kinematicState) ∧ holds(S ,freeGrasp) ⇒
∃H dynamic(H) ∧ S = start(H)∧ startTime(H) < endTime(H) ∧
throughout(H ,freeGrasp).
DYN.13 holds(S ,kinematicState) ∧ [holds(S ,grasping(O )) ∨ holds(S ,freeGrasp)] ⇒
∃H dynamic(H) ∧ S=start(H) ∧ startTime(H) < endTime(H) ∧
throughoutxSE(H ,grasping(O )).
DYN.14 [kinematic(HK ) ∧ holds(start(HK ),grasping(O )) ∧
[∀O1∈objectsOf(H) parallelMotion(O1, O , HK ) ∨ motionless(O1, HK )]] ⇒
∃H2 startTime(HK ) = startTime(H2) < endTime(H2) ∧ start(H2) = start(HK )∧
sameMotionOn(H2, HK , {O },0) ∧ throughoutxSE(H2,grasping(O )) ∧
dynamic(H2).
(These are all discussed in the text.)
remain motionless. Clearly this is kinematically possible, given the condition COND.6. Axiom DYN.14 thus asserts that it is
dynamically possible to carry the box along at least an initial segment of the speciﬁed trajectory, though the actual behavior
of the objects may not be that of HK . The objects in the box may settle, or other objects may move, for reasons of their
own.
4.6.3. Heaps and stability
We next address the issue of heaps and stable heaps (Table 18). Again, the discussion here is preliminary; it is adequate
to the problem of carrying cargo in boxes, but a considerably richer and more powerful theory would be required to analyze
the problem of carrying cargo piled in heaps on trays.
A heap is deﬁned (deﬁnition HD.3) as in Section 3.6. As with dynamic histories, we do not give necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for a collection of objects to be in a stable heaps; we just posit some of the axioms that are needed for the
inference we are concerned with. A state is stable if every freely moving object is part of a stable heap supported by ﬁxed
and grasped objects.
Axiom H.1 asserts that a stable heap is a heap. Axiom H.2 asserts that if UH is a stable heap supported by U S which
remains motionless, and is isolated from all other objects then UH likewise remains motionless and remains a stable heap.
Axiom H.3 asserts that if a set of objects is isolated and no object is moved by the agent, then eventually the set attains a
stable state. Axiom H.4 asserts that if UH is a stable heap on U S in state S1, and in S2 the objects in UH and U S are in the
same positions as in S1 and UH is isolated from everything except U S in S2, then UH is a stable heap with supports U S
in S2. (That is, the positions of other objects that are not in contact with UH do not affect whether UH is stable.) Axiom
HD.5, HD.6, and H.5 encode the default rule used to infer that the box does not fall over during loading (Section 3.3.6):
If object O B is stably supported by motionless object OT , and the objects in set UC are always above the convex hull of
the contact points of O B with OT , and {O B} ∪ UC are isolated from everything except OT , then by default O B remains
motionless. Speciﬁcally, axiom HD.5 deﬁnes a history in which this default rule is violated as exhibiting anomaly 2. Axiom
HD.6 deﬁnes a history H as satisfying the property “noAnomaly2” if no slice of H exhibits anomaly 2. Default rule H.5 states
that dynamic histories by default satisfy the “noAnomaly2” property.
4.6.4. No upward motion
The ﬁnal category of physical rules is the default rule that prevents the cargo from coming out of the top of the box.
This follows our formulation in Section 3.7. Object O undergoes an upward motion with respect to object set U S in H if, for
every object O1 in U S and for every coordinate system Q C that can be “attached” to O1 at any time in H , the z-coordinate
of the center of mass of O relative to Q C is higher at the end of H than at the beginning of H . An upward motion of O
in H relative to U S is anomalous if O is part of a heap UH supported by U S at the start of H and UH is isolated from
everything except U S during H . A history H has no anomalous upward motions if none of the objects in H have anomalous
upward motions in any temporal slice of H . By default, a dynamic history has no anomalous upward motions.
4.7. Comprehension axioms for histories
We will need to reason that, if the agent is grasping an object, then he can move it along any “well-behaved” trajec-
tory consistent with the laws of physics. The dynamic axioms DYN.1 through DYN.14, especially DYN.12, enumerate some
conditions that are suﬃcient for a history to be physically possible. What we need additionally are axioms that assert that
all these histories exist; speciﬁcally, that for any “well-behaved” (to be deﬁned below) mathematical function from time to
mappings, there exists a history in which object O follows that function. Such axioms are comprehension axioms for his-
tories. There are two, not very different, ways to state these; either using ﬁrst-order axiom schemas or using higher-order
logic. There are subtle differences between the expressive power of these two, but nothing that affects our inferences here.
In this paper, I will use ﬁrst-order schemas to simplify the notational and sortal issues involved.
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Heaps and stability: Symbols and deﬁnitions.
Symbols:
connectedGroup(U : objectSet) → ﬂuent[Bool].
allFree(U : objectSet) → ﬂuent[Bool].
heap(UH,U S: objectSet) → ﬂuent[Bool].
stableHeap(UH,U S: objectSet) → ﬂuent[Bool].
stable(U : objectSet) → ﬂuent[Bool].
anomaly2(H: history).
noAnomaly2(H: history).
Deﬁnitions:
HD.1 holds(S ,connectedGroup(U )) ⇔
U ⊂objectsOf(S) ∧
∀U1,U2 U1 = ∅ ∧ U2 = ∅ ∧ U1∪ U2= U ⇒
∃O1∈U1,O2∈U2 holds(S ,rccC#(↑ O1,↑ O2)).
(A set of objects U is a connected group in state S if it cannot be divided into two spatially separated subsets U1 and U2).
HD.2 holds(S ,allFree(U )) ≡ ∀O∈U holds(S ,freeMotion(O )).
HD.3 holds(S ,heap(UH,U S)) ⇔
holds(S ,connectedGroup(UH) ∧# allFree(UH)) ∧
U S ⊂objectsOf(S) ∧ U S ∩ UH = ∅ ∧
[∀OH∈UH,O S∈objectsOf(S) holds(S, rccC#(OH, O S)) ⇒ O S ∈ UH ∪ U S] ∧
[∀O S∈U S ∃OH∈UH holds(S ,rccC#(↑ O S,↑ OH))].
(Deﬁnition of a heap, as in Section 3.6.)
HD.4 holds(S ,stable(U )) ⇔
∀O∈U holds(S ,freeMotion(O )) ⇒
∃UH,U S⊂U O ∈ UH ∧ holds(S ,stableHeap(UH,U S)) ∧
∀O S∈U S ¬holds(S ,freeMotion(O S)).
(A set of objects U is stable in state S if every mobile object in U is part of a stable heap supported by ﬁxed or grasped objects.)
HD.5 anomaly2(H) ≡
∃UC,O B,OT ,S2
dynamic(H) ∧ throughout(H ,isolated(UC ∪ {O B}, OT ) ∧# freeMotion(O B)) ∧
sameStateOn(start(H),S2,{O B, OT }) ∧ holds(S2,stableHeap({O B}, {OT })) ∧
[∀O∈UC throughout(H ,above#(↑ O , convexHull#(↑ OT∩∗ ↑ O B)))] ∧
throughout(H ,motionless(OT )) ∧ ¬throughout(H ,motionless(O B)).
HD.6 noAnomaly2(H) ≡ ¬∃H1 historySlice(H1, H) ∧ anomaly2(H1).
Table 19
Heaps and stability: Axioms.
Axioms: (These are discussed in the text.)
H.1 holds(S ,stableHeap(UH,U S)) ⇒ holds(S ,heap(UH,U S)) ∧ U S = ∅.
H.2 [dynamic( J ) ∧ holds(start( J ),stableHeap(UH,U S)) ∧
throughout( J ,isolated(UH,U S)) ∧ ∀O∈U S motionless( J , O )] ⇒
∀O∈UH motionless( J , O ) ∧ throughout( J ,stableHeap(UH,U S)).
H.3 [dynamic( J ) ∧ unbounded( J ) ∧
throughout( J ,isolated(UM,U F ) ∧# allFree(UM)) ∧
[∀O∈U F motionless( J , O )]] ⇒
∃ J1 historySuﬃx( J1, J ) ∧ throughout( J1,stable(U F ∪ UM)).
H.4 holds(S1,stableHeap(UH,U F )) ∧ sameStateOn(S1, S2,UH ∪ U F ) ∧
holds(S2,isolated(UH,U F )) ⇒
holds(S2,stableHeap(UH,U F )).
Reiterian Default Rule:
H.5 dynamic( J ) : noAnomaly2( J ) / noAnomaly2( J ).
Table 20
Center of mass.
Symbol: centerOfMass(O ) → pseudo.
Axioms:
CM.1 ∀O :object point(shape(centerOfMass(O )).
CM.2 ∀O :object shape(centerOfMass(O )) ∈ convexHull(shape(O )).
The more serious question is what class of mathematical functions should be considered well-behaved. Note that this is,
in general, a superset of the histories that are physically possible i.e. that satisfy dynamic(H). Rather, these are the histories
that are, so to speak, conceptually possible. Therefore, the decision here is mostly a matter of the convenience of the theory
developer.
E. Davis / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 299–345 333Table 21
Default rule excluding anomalous upward motion.
Symbols:
upwardMotion(O object, U S: objectSet, H: history).
anomalousUpwardMotion(O : object, H: history).
noAnomUpwardMotion(H: history).
Deﬁnitions:
UD.1 upwardMotion(O ,U S, H) ≡
∀O S∈U S,Q C,SM [source(Q C) = O S ∧ coordinateSystem(Q C) ∧ stateOf(SM, H) ∧
value(SM ,zAxis#(↑ Q C)) = zˆ] ⇒
value(end(H),zCoor#(↑centerOfMass(O ),↑ Q C)) >
value(start(H),zCoor#(centerOfMass(↑ O ),↑ Q C)).
UD.2 anomalousUpwardMotion(O , H) ≡
∃UH,U S O ∈ UH ∧ holds(start(H),heap(UH,U S)) ∧
throughout(H ,isolated(UH,U S) ∧# allFree(UH)) ∧ upwardMotion(O ,U S, H).
UD.3 noAnomUpwardMotion(H) ≡
∀O∈objects(H),H1 historySlice(H1, H) ⇒ ¬anomalousUpwardMotion(O , H1).
Reiterian Default Rule:
UP.1 dynamic(H) : noAnomUpwardMotion(H) / noAnomUpwardMotion(H).
There are two major constraints on the class of histories that we wish to enforce. The ﬁrst, already discussed, is that we
will require all histories to be continuous. The second, more subtle, can be stated in the following principle:
HCP.1 Let h1,h2,h3 . . . be an inﬁnite sequence of histories, such that hi is a proper preﬁx of hi+1 for all i. Then there exists
a uhistory j∞ which is an extension of all the hi .
The force of this principle is most clearly illustrated in terms of an example that violates it. Suppose that for each k, hk
is the history such that startTime(hk) = −1, endTime(hk) = −1/k, and for all T between startTime(hk) and endTime(hk), the
placement of O at time T in hk is a translation by distance sin(1/T ) in the xˆ direction. Then each hk is a preﬁx of hk+1, but
there does not exist a j∞ that subsumes them all, because the position of O does not converge to a limit at T = 0.
To avoid this, we require that histories satisfy a Lipschitz condition that, between times T A and T B , no point in any
object moves a distance greater than maxSpeed·|T B − T A|, where maxSpeed is a constant. It is easily shown that if
h1,h2 . . . satisfy the Lipschitz condition and hi is a preﬁx of hi+1, then the limit history j∞ exists and also satisﬁes the
Lipschitz condition.
We chose to use this particular Lipschitz condition for reasons of simplicity. In the long run, imposing an attainable
upper bound on speed could be problematic for a Newtonian theory; obviously it is not consistent with either Galilean or
Einsteinian relativity or with the solution to some collision problems. There are many other possible condition that could be
imposed instead for the same purpose. Keep in mind that there is no harm in imposing a very weak condition on histories,
as long as it is suﬃcient to guarantee HCP.1.
The real reason that we need principle HCP.1 is to justify the conclusion (Lemma 1.5 of our formal proof) that it is
always possible to attempt to carry out any given plan and to work on it until either it fails, it succeeds, or it cannot be
continued. If we allow histories like those in our counter-example above, then the plan of moving an object along the path
f (t) = sin(1/T )xˆ can be begun over the interval [−1,−1/T ] for every T < 0 but not over the interval [−1,0]; it is diﬃcult
to deﬁne a semantics of planning in a way that accommodates this.
As stated above, HCP.1 involves quantifying over inﬁnite sequences of histories. Rather than do that, we use axiom
schema HC.3 below. Let Ψ (H) be a property of histories H , and let H0 be a history satisfying Ψ . (Ψ may have associated
some parameters X ; in this case, each valuation on X determines a property of H .) Let Γ ( J1) be the property, “ J1 is
an extension of H0 and every proper preﬁx of J1 that extends H0 satisﬁes Φ”. Then there exists a uhistory JM that is
maximal with respect to Γ ; that is, Γ holds on JM but not on any proper extension of JM .
Axiom schema HC.3 is approximately equivalent to principle HCP.1 in the following sense. On the one hand, HCP.1 plus
the axiom of choice entails HC.3. Proof: Let us write hA < hB if H0 is a preﬁx of hA , hA is a proper preﬁx of hB , and Γ (hB);
clearly this is a partial ordering. By Zorn’s lemma, there exists a maximal set of histories that is linearly ordered under <.
Let H be some such maximal totally ordered set. If the end times of the histories in H are bounded above, let T Z be the
least upper bound of these end times; let h′K be any history in H whose end time is greater than T Z − 1/K and let hK
be the preﬁx of h′K ending at time T Z − 1/K . If the end times of the histories in H are not bounded above, let h′K be
any history with end time greater than K , and let hK be the preﬁx of h′K with end time equal to K . In either case, it is
immediate that hK < hK+1 so by HCP.1 there exists some j∞ that extends all the hK . If T Z is bounded, then the preﬁx of
j∞ that ends at T Z satisﬁes the conclusion of HC.3; if not, then j∞ itself satisﬁes the conclusion of HC.3.
Conversely, HC.3 implies HCP.1, as long as hK can be deﬁned in terms of a ﬁrst-order formula in H and K ; the proof is
immediate.
Axiom HC.2 asserts that any system of motions satisfying the Lipschitz condition constitutes a history. Here Ψ (O , T ,M)
is a ﬁrst-order formula that deﬁnes a mapping from object O and time T to rigid mapping M . Axiom HC.2 states that if, for
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Comprehension axioms on histories: Symbols and deﬁnitions.
Symbols:
maxSpeed → real.
mapDist(M1,M2: rigidMapping, O : object) → distance.
Deﬁnitions:
HCD.1 mapDist(M1,M2, O ) = D ⇔
[∃P∈shape(O ) mappingDistance(M1,M2, P ) = D] ∧
[∀P∈shape(O ) mappingDistance(M1,M2, P ) D].
HCD.2 Let Ψ (O : object, T : time, M: rigidMapping, X) be a formula.
Then LipschitzΨ (O , X, T S, T E) is deﬁned to be the following formula:
∀T1,T2:time,M1,M2:rigidMapping
T S  T1 T2 T E ∧ Ψ (O , T1,M1, X) ∧ Ψ (O , T2,M2, X) ⇒
mapDist(M1,M2, O )  maxSpeed · (T2− T1).
HCD.3 Let Φ(H: history,X) be a formula.
AllPPsΦ(H, X) is deﬁned to be the formula:
∀H1 historyProperPreﬁx(H1, H) ⇒ Φ(H1, X).
T  T S and O ∈ U , Ψ deﬁnes a function from O and T to M that satisﬁes the Lipschitz condition, then there is a uhistory
J that corresponds to Ψ ; that is startTime( J ) = T S , objectsOf( J ) = U , and for every object O ∈ U and time T  T S the
placement of O at time T in H is the value that satisﬁes Ψ (O , T , H).
Axioms HC.1 and HC.2 give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a system of object motions to constitute a history. For
this domain, this is an almost complete characterization of the class of histories. A complete characterization would involve
additionally:
• Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the evolution of grasping relations over time.
• A uniqueness axiom stating that any two histories with the same time interval, the same objects, the same motions,
and the same grasping relations are in fact the same history.
• A comprehension axiom on states, positing that any placement of a set of objects constitutes a state.
If we were to posit such a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions, then quite a few of our axioms would in fact be
consequences of these conditions, speciﬁcally T.1—T.5, K.4, K.5, G.1—G.2, DYN.1, DYN.2 and HC.3. We have not taken this
approach for reasons of elaboration tolerance. Axioms like these are applicable to a wide range of temporal and physical
theories; by contrast, the proposed necessary and suﬃcient conditions on histories apply only to the partial theory of rigid
solid objects that we consider in this paper (Tables 20–22).
Finally, the comprehension axiom HC.4 is a variant of HC.3. HC.3 states that there is always a maximal history over a
topologically closed history JM that extends H and satisﬁes the condition “Φ holds over all proper preﬁxes of JM”. HC.4
states, in effect, that there is a maximal history either over a closed interval, or over an interval that is open on the right,
that extends H and satisﬁes the condition “Φ holds over all closed preﬁxes (not necessarily proper) of JM”. Since our
ontology does not include histories over open time intervals, the statement of this is somewhat indirect. The point of this
is to deal with time structures which branch at the end point of an interval. If the agent is attempting to keep a ﬂuent like
“grasping(O )” true, and, following an open history there is one end point that keeps grasping(O ) true and one that makes
it false, — i.e. the agent can choose to ungrasp(O ) at the end of H — we need to deduce that the agent can choose the one
that keeps it true, and can continue to keep it true through the continuum of such choices that must be made.
The formal statement of these axioms proceeds as follows. First, let deﬁne the distance between rigid mappings M1 and
M2 relative to object O , mapDist(M1,M2, O ) as the maximum over all points P in shape(O ) of the distance from M1(P )
to M2(P ) (deﬁnition HCD.1).
Let Ψ (O : object, T : time, M: rigidMapping, X1 . . . Xk) be any open formula with free variables O , T , M , and optional
additional free variables X1 . . . Xk of any sort. For simplicity we will write the arguments X1 . . . Xk as a single argument X .
Assume that for any given object O and parameter value X , Ψ implicitly deﬁnes a function Ψ ′O ,X (T ) be from time T to
a rigid mapping M . that is, Ψ (O , T ,M, X) ⇔ M = Ψ ′O ,X (T ). The formula LipschitzΨ (O , X, T S, T E) asserts that, for a given
value of O and X , throughout the time interval T S, T E , the function Ψ ′O ,X (T ) satisﬁes the Lipschitz condition that for any
point P in shape(O ), the distance from [Ψ ′O ,X (T1)](P ) to [Ψ ′O ,X (T2)](P ) is at most maxSpeed · |T2− T1|.
The deﬁnition of the Lipschitz condition is given in deﬁnition HCD.2. Note that this includes the condition that Ψ deﬁnes
a single-valued mapping (consider the case where T2= T1). Axioms HC.1, HC.2, HC.3 can now be stated as in Table 23.
4.8. Executing plans
Since our objective is to validate plan1, we next need to deﬁne what it means for a plan to be a correct solution to
a problem. That is, we need to deﬁne a semantics of plans. As our plans are partially speciﬁed and our model of time is
continuous, this is not entirely an established theory.
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Comprehension axioms on histories.
Axioms:
HC.1 ∀O ,H,T1,T2,S1,S2 T1 T2 ∧ stateAt(H, T1, S1) ∧ stateAt(H, T2, S2) ⇒
mapDist(value(S1,placement(O )), value(S2,placement(O )), O ) 
maxSpeed · (T2− T1).
Axiom HC.1 asserts that the Lipschitz condition holds on the formula,
“∃S stateAt(H, T , S) ∧ M = value(S,placement(O ))”.
HC.2 Let Ψ and LipschitzΨ be as in HCD.2. Assume that the variables U , T S , and J do not appear free in Ψ .
Then the following formula is an axiom:
∀U :objectSet,T S:time,X
[∀O∈U ,T E:time T S < T E ⇒ LipschitzΨ (O , X, T S, T E)] ⇒
∃ J :uhistory startTime( J ) = T S∧ unbounded( J ) ∧ objectsOf( J ) = U∧
∀T ,S,M stateAt( J , T , S) ∧ Ψ (O , T ,M, X) ⇒ value(S,placement(O )) = M .
HC.3 Let Φ(H: history,X) be an open formula with a free variable H of sort history and optionally other free
variables X . Assume that variables JM and H1 are not free in Φ . Then the following is an axiom:
∀H,X AllPPsΦ(H, X) ⇒
∃ JM historyPreﬁx(H, JM) ∧ AllPPsΦ( JM, X) ∧
∀H1 historyProperPreﬁx( JM, H1) ⇒ ¬AllPPsΦ(H1, X).
HC.4 Let Φ(H: history,X) be as in HC.3. Then the following is an axiom:
∀H,X AllPPsΦ(H, X) ⇒
∃ JM historyPreﬁx(H, JM) ∧ AllPPsΦ( JM, X) ∧
[¬∃ J1 sameUntilEnd( J1, JM) ∧ Φ( J1)] ∨
[Φ( JM) ∧
∀H1 historyProperPreﬁx( JM, H1) ⇒ ¬AllPPsΦ(H1, X) ]].
We will develop our theory top–down. A standard deﬁnition of the semantics of a partial plan is that the plan P correctly
achieves a task T starting in state S if the following holds: for all H , if H is a history starting in S , and the agent attempts
to execute P in H , then he succeeds in executing P in H and the execution of P constitutes a successful accomplishment
of T . (This deﬁnition does not address the issues of knowledge preconditions or knowledge acquisition.)
What is meant by a successful execution of plan P in H is generally quite apparent from the form of P ; representational
systems for partial plans usually directly characterize a successful execution. What is meant by an attempt to execute P is
often less obvious. For a TWEAK-style partial plan [4], for instance, we can deﬁne “attempts” as follows: a beginning of an
execution of plan P is an execution of the ﬁrst k steps of the plan under some ordering and variable binding consistent
with the constraints. P is attempted in H if P is begun in H and cannot be continued, either because P is complete, or
because there are no next steps whose preconditions are met.16
The ﬁrst thought is to deﬁne an attempt to execute P as the initial segment of a complete execution of P ; but under
that deﬁnition of “attempt”, the above deﬁnition of “correctness” become vacuous. Rather, we have to go in the opposite
direction. We view the form of the plan as specifying what it means to “attempt” the plan, and as specifying when such an
attempt constitutes a successful execution of the plan. Additionally, as mentioned above, the fact that we are dealing with
real-valued time means that more care has to be taken than in similar theories over discrete time.
We proceed, then, as follows: The semantics of a plan P is speciﬁed in terms of four primitive predicates. The predicate
“worksOn(P , H)” states that H constitute a partial or complete execution of P . The predicate “beginnable(P , S)” states that
it is possible to initiate execution of P in S . The predicate “completion(P , H)” states that H constitutes a complete execution
of P .
For example, consider the plan, pHardBoil = “Hard-boil egg egg1”. The formula “beginnable(pHardBoil,S1)” is true
if in S1 there is a pot P O T1 with water on a burner B1 of the stove. The formula “completion(pHardBoil,H)” is true if
the sequence “put egg1 into P O T1; turn the knob controlling B1; wait 12 minutes” is completely executed in H ; and the
formula “worksOn(pHardBoil,H)” is true if some initial segment of that sequence is executed in H .
The relations “attempts(P , J )” and “completes(P , H)” are deﬁned in terms of the above three predicates. To simplify the
process of plan deﬁnition, we require that our deﬁnitions of “attempts” and “completes” be coherent and well-behaved for
any deﬁnition of “worksOn”, “beginnable”, and “completion”, whether or not these satisfy any particular logical or temporal
relations. For instance, intuitively one might think that if worksOn(P , H) holds, then worksOn(P , H1) should hold for any
16 This is actually weaker (more inclusive) than Chapman’s semantics, because it requires only that at each there is some step in the plan whose pre-
decessors have been executed and whose preconditions are met. By contrast, Chapman’s semantics require that the preconditions are satisﬁed for every
step whose predecessors have been executed. To achieve Chapman’s semantics, it is necessary to deﬁne the beginning of the execution of a plan as the
combination of the execution of some of the steps together with the choice of a next step to execute, among steps all of whose predecessors have been
executed. Chapman’s deﬁnition is computationally more tractable; it is veriﬁable in polynomial time, whereas verifying our deﬁnition is NP-hard.
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starts in S . However, we do not impose either of these conditions, or indeed any constraints whatever on these three base
relations. Indeed, we could consistently specify a comprehension axiom, analogous to axiom P.2 of [8], which states that
there exists a plan for any deﬁnition of these three predicates; we have not done that here because it is somewhat complex
and we do not here need such an axiom. Achieving this in a theory of real-valued time requires a little care.
The predicate “attempts(P , J )” and some of the other predicates we will deﬁne, takes as argument a possibly unbounded
uhistory J to deal with the case that the plan P goes into an inﬁnite loop.
We posit a constant positive duration “reactionTime”, which is the time required for the agent to “realize” that
the completion criterion “completion(P , H)” has been met. Of course, this is often realistic, but that is not the actual
reason that we are including this feature in our theory. (The small increase in realism would not be worth the complexity
and inelegance.) Rather the point of including this is to deal coherently with cases where “completion(P , H)” holds over
an interval of time that is open on the left (or more generally where it holds on a set of time points that does not
contain its lower boundary). For instance, if the predicate “completion(P , H)” is deﬁned as “the center of mass of O is
more than 1 foot higher than the table”, then there is no ﬁrst time at which the predicate becomes true, so it would not
be consistent to specify that the agent stops working on the plan as soon as the completion condition holds. Therefore,
we deﬁne the predicate “reactComplete(P , H)” (the agent can achieve the completion criterion of P and react to it) as
holding if H ﬁnishes at a time which is reactionTime greater than the greatest lower bound on the times at which
“completion(P , H)” becomes true (PLD.1). Note it is possible that “completion(P , H)” will no longer be true by the time that
“reactComplete(P , H)” becomes true, but that is not a problem; in such a case, “completes(P , H)” still holds (Tables 24, 25).
The imposition of a constant time delay on the completion of a plan has two further advantages in terms of achieving
a coherent semantics. First, it eliminates the problem of deﬁning “sequence(P1, P2)” where P1 completes instantaneously;
second, it eliminates the problems of loops that execute inﬁnitely many iterations in ﬁnite time. The disadvantage of this is
that we must now deﬁne “worksOn(P , H)” in such a way that the agent works on P for the duration reactionTime after
P has met the completion criterion; if worksOn is not so deﬁned, then “completes(P , H)” will not be achieved.
Our deﬁnitions now continue as follows: The predicate “baseExec(P , H)” (H is a strictly partial execution of P )
holds if H is dynamic and worksOn(P , H) (PLD.2). The predicate “incompleteExec(P , H)” holds if baseExec(P , H) but not
reactComplete(P , H) (PLD.3).
We need to deﬁne “attempt” in such a way that the agent continues to work on P as long as possible. There are two
cases to be addressed here, corresponding to the two topologies of the right-hand side of a time interval. First, if the agent
has been working on P over a closed time interval, and it is possible for him to continue working on P , then he does so.
Second, if he has been working on P over an time interval that is open on the right, and it is possible for him to continue
working on P over the closure of that interval, then he does so.
Thus, we deﬁne the following predicates. The predicate “beginsxE(P , H)” meaning “P begins over H except possibly at
its end” holds if P is beginnable at the start of J and incompleteExec(P , H1) holds over every proper preﬁx H1 of J (PLD.4).
The predicate “begins(P , H)” holds if baseExec(P , H) holds as well (PLD.5).
A plan P is continuable at the end of H written “continuableEnd(P , H)” if beginsxE(P , H) and it would be possible to
continue working on P at the last moment of H (PLD.6). A plan P is continuable after H , written continuable(P , H, Q ) if it
begins over some extension of H satisfying Q (PLD.7).
Plan P is attempted over H subject to isolation condition Q , (a) P is not beginnable at the start of H , and H consists
of that single state; or (b) beginxE(P , H) but P cannot be continued at the end of H ; or (c) P begins over H but is not
continuable past H (PLD.8). P completes over H if P is attempted over H and reactComplete(P , H) (PLD.9).
Thus, if P completes over H , then P is beginnable at start(H); worksOn(P , H1) holds over every initial segment H1 of
H ; and completion(P , H1) holds over the initial segment H1 that ends a time reactionTime before the end of H .
A problem is a speciﬁcation of a starting state, a success criterion, and an isolation condition. Plan P is a correct solution
of problem R if the following holds: If H is a dynamic history starting in S satisfying the isolation condition, and P is
attempted in H , then P is completed in H and H satisﬁes the success condition of R . For instance in our egg boiling
example, we might posit that H satisﬁes the success conditions of the problem boilEgg if egg1 is hard-boiled at the end
of H , and that it satisﬁes the isolation condition of H if no other object interferes with the burner knob, the pot, or the egg
during H .
There is, however, a diﬃculty integrating our default rules with this deﬁnition of “correct solution”. The default rules H.5
and UP.1 above support the following inference: if history h1 starts in state s1, plan1 is attempted in h1, and h1 satisﬁes
the isolation conditions, then plan1 will be completed in h1 and h1 will satisfy the success condition of problem1.
However, Reiterian default theory does not permit us to carry out universal abstraction and conclude that this condition
holds for all histories H satisfying these conditions. Nor should it, at least in this instance. As we discussed in Section 3.3.5,
it is not generally reasonable to assert that there is no history satisfying these conditions in which catapulting does not
occur, since, with many sets of cargo objects, the agent can actually carry out the plan in such a way that catapulting
occurs, if he so chooses. What we really want to say is that plan1 is a “generally correct” solution for problem1, meaning
that most histories H that satisfy start(H) = start(problem1), isolationCondition(problem1,H) and attempts(plan1,H)
also satisfy completes(plan1,H) and succeeds(problem1,H). This is an object-level relation between problems and plans
(given some ﬁxed probability distribution over histories) which is quite distinct from the default inference given above.
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Plan semantics: Sorts and symbols.
Sorts:
plan.
problem.
Symbols:
reactionTime → duration.
worksOn(P : plan, H: history).
beginnable(P : plan S: state).
completion(P : plan, H: history).
reactComplete(P : plan, H: history).
baseExec(P : plan, H: history).
beginsxE(P : plan, H: uhistory).
begins(P : plan, J : uhistory).
continuableEnd(P : plan, H:uhistory).
continuable(P : plan, J : uhistory).
attempts(P : plan, J : uhistory).
completes(P : plan, H: history).
startProblem(R: problem) → state.
isolationCondition(R: problem, J : uhistory).
succeeds(R: problem, H: history).
Table 25
Plan semantics.
Deﬁnitions:
PLD.1 reactComplete(P , H) ≡
∀D D <reactionTime ⇒
∃T C,HC T C <endTime(H)−D ∧ hSlice(H ,startTime(H),T C ,HC) ∧
completion(P , HC).
PLD.2 baseExec(P , H) ≡
dynamic(H) ∧ beginnable(P ,start(H)) ∧ worksOn(P , H).
PLD.3 incompleteExec(P , H) ≡ baseExec(P , H) ∧ ¬reactComplete(P , H).
PLD.4 beginsxE(P , H) ≡
beginnable(P ,start(H)) ∧ dynamic(H) ∧
∀H1 historyProperPreﬁx(H1, H) ⇒ incompleteExec(P , H1).
PLD.5 begins(P , H) ≡ beginsxE(P , H) ∧ baseExec(P , H).
PLD.6 continuableEnd(P , H) ≡
∃H1 sameUntilEnd(H1, H) ∧ begins(P , H1).
PLD.7 continuable(P , H) ≡
∃H1 historyProperPreﬁx(H, H1) ∧ begins(P , H1).
PLD.8 attempts(P , J ) ≡
[¬beginnable(P ,start( J )) ∧ singleHist( J ,start( J ))] ∨
[beginsxE(P , J ) ∧ ¬continuableEnd(P , J )] ∨
[begins(P , J ) ∧ ¬continuable(P , J )].
PLD.9 completes(P , H) ≡ attempts(P , H) ∧ reactComplete(P , H).
Axiom:
PL.1 0 < reactionTime.
However, developing the requisite theory of measures of sets of histories is beyond the scope of this paper. We hope to
return to this issue in future work, perhaps using a probabilistic logic along the lines of Bacchus [2].
It should be also noted that our treatment of isolation conditions is not actually quite what is wanted. The problem
is that, in the above deﬁnition, a plan P vacuously satisﬁes the conditions for being a “correct” solution to a problem
if P speciﬁes that the agent should himself deliberately violate the isolation conditions. Or, even more cleverly, P could
specify that if something goes wrong, then the agent should deliberately violate the isolation conditions. I have not found
any adequate solution to this, and it may indeed be the case that, in the ﬁnal analysis, boundary conditions for planning
problems must be stated in terms of constraints on the starting state and not of constraints on the history. (Providing
isolation from the actions of other agents would then entail calling on some richer theory of multi-agent interactions.)
However, this concern does not affect the analysis in this paper. It certainly does not affect the validity of using isolation
conditions in physical axioms such as H.2, H.4, and UD.2; it is only relevant to the question of the relation of plans to
problems.
4.8.1. Control structures
In deﬁning plan1, we use the standard programming language control structures “sequence” and “while”. The seman-
tics of these operators is speciﬁed in our theory by axioms which state how the predicates “beginnable”, “worksOn”, and
“completion” are deﬁned for a complex plan in terms of its components. The axioms are given in Table 26, and are self-
explanatory.
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Semantics of plan control operators.
Symbols:
sequence(P1 . . . Pk: plan) → plan.
if1(Q : ﬂuent[Bool],P : plan) → plan. (Single-branch conditional).
while(Q : ﬂuent[Bool],P : plan) → plan.
Axioms:
CTL.1 beginnable(sequence(P1, P2),S) ⇔ beginnable(P1, S).
CTL.2 worksOn(sequence(P1, P2), J ) ⇔
[worksOn(P1, J ) ∧ ¬∃H historyProperPreﬁx(H, J ) ∧ completes(P1, H)]∨
∃H1, J2 hsplice(H1, J2, H) ∧ completes(P1, H1) ∧ worksOn(P2, J2).
CTL.3 completion(sequence(P1, P2),H) ⇔
∃H1,H2 hsplice(H1, H2, H) ∧ completes(P1, H1) ∧ completion(P2, H2).
CTL.4 beginnable(if1(Q , P ),S) ⇔
¬holds(S, Q ) ∨ beginnable(P , S).
CTL.5 worksOn(if1(Q , P ),H) ⇔
[holds(start(H),Q ) ∧ worksOn(P , H)] ∨
[¬holds(start(H),Q ) ∧ throughout(H ,freeGrasp)].
(Note: the condition throughout(H ,freeGrasp) means simply that,
if condition Q fails, the agent carries out a noop.)
CTL.6 completion(if1(Q , P ),H) ⇔
[holds(start(H),Q ) ∧ completion(P , H)] ∨
[¬holds(start(H),Q ) ∧ endTime(H)=startTime(H)].
CTL.7 sequence(P1, P2 . . . Pk) = sequence(P1,sequence(P2, . . . sequence(Pk−1, Pk) . . .)).
CTL.8 while(Q , P ) = if1(Q ,sequence(P ,while(Q , P ))).
Table 27
Axioms for primitive actions.
Symbols:
move(O : object,H: history) → plan.
waitUntil(Q : ﬂuent[Bool]) → plan.
Axioms:
AC.1 beginnable(move(O , H),S) ⇔
sameStateOn(S , start(H), {O })
AC.2 worksOn(move(O , HT ),H) ⇔
∃D D = startTime(H)-startTime(HT ) ∧ sameMotionOn(H, HT , {O }, D) ∧
∀T ,S stateAt(H, T + D, S) ⇒
[startTime(HT ) < T < endTime(HT ) ⇒ holds(S ,grasping(O ))] ∧
[T  endTime(HT ) ⇒ holds(S ,freeGrasp)].
AC.3 completion(move(O , HT ),H) ⇔
∃D D =startTime(H)−startTime(HT ) ∧ endTime(HT )+D  endTime(H) ∧
sameMotionOn(H, HT , {O }, D).
AC.4 ∀Q ,S beginnable(waitUntil(Q ),S).
AC.5 worksOn(waitUntil(Q ),H) ⇔ throughout(H ,freeGrasp).
AC.6 ∀H completion(waitUntil(Q ),H) ⇔ ∃T ,S stateAt(H, T , S) ∧ holds(S, Q ).
4.8.2. Primitive action: move and wait
There are two primitive actions in our theory:
• Move object O along the trajectory in history H . H is any history containing O ; all that is signiﬁcant about H is the
trajectory that O follows in H .
• Wait until Boolean ﬂuent Q becomes true.
Formally we consider these primitive actions to be of sort “plan”. Their semantics is therefore given in terms of the
predicates “beginnable”, “worksOn”, and “completion”. The axioms are given in Table 27; they are mostly self-explanatory,
but a few require some discussion.
Axiom AC.3 asserts that the completion condition for the action “Move O along trajectory HT ” is met in history H if
O executes the same motion in H as in HT subject to a time shift D and H continues at least as long as HT . However,
our planning semantics requires that we deﬁne what it means to work on a plan for a time reactionTime after the
completion condition is satisﬁed. (This is the disadvantage of positing a ﬁnite reaction time.) Axiom AC.2 reﬂects this. In
history H , O is moved along trajectory HT if (a) the motion of O is H is the same as its motion in HT up until either
the end time of H or the end time of HT , whichever comes ﬁrst; (b) during the part of H up to the end time of HT , O is
grasped; (c) if H continues past the end time of HT , then the agent is not doing anything in this ﬁnal segment.
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Problem speciﬁcation: Symbols.
Symbols:
oTable1, oTable2 → object.
oBox → object.
qInsideBox → pseudoObject.
qTopBox → pseudoObject.
rCuboid → region. Empty cuboid inside the box.
lCube,wCube,hCube → distance.
uCargo → objectSet.
u1 → objectSet. The set of movable objects (cargo and box).
s1 → state. Initial state.
s2 → state. Hypothetical state with the box on Table 2.
maxCargoDiam → distance. Maximum diameter of any cargo object.
manipSpace1 → region. Free space above Table 1 for loading cargo into box.
manipSpace2 → region.
Free space from top of table 1 to top of Table 2 for carrying box.
carryingPath → history. Possible trajectory of box from Table 1 to Table 2.
loadingCount(D, L,W , H: distance) → integer.
Conservative estimate of maximum number of cargo objects (see Section 3.3.2.)
4.9. Problem speciﬁcation
We can now give the speciﬁcation of our particular problem. There are, of course, many ways to formulate the problem.
The choice of formulation involves a tradeoff between ﬁve desiderata: generality, that is, making the conditions as weak
as possible; simplicity of the constraints; simplicity of the plan; standard form (e.g. describing regions in terms of speciﬁc
geometric constraints rather than in terms of the existence of a path); and ease of constructing the proof of correctness.
(Ease of proof is a desideratum because we are not really interested here in clever or deep object-level proofs, just in
demonstrating the adequacy of the representation.) The speciﬁc choices we have made are largely arbitrary; we have tried
to include generalizations that we felt were interesting and exclude those that are merely diﬃcult.
The symbols (mostly constants) and axioms17 here are given in Tables 28, 29 and 30. The symbols are explained in
Table 28 where necessary. Axioms PR.1–PR.7 characterize the objects: The set u1 includes the cargo and the box (PR.1), all
of which are mobile (PR.2). PR.4 asserts that the box is box-shaped, and PR.3 deﬁnes the pseudo-objects associated with its
inside and its opening. The two tables are ﬁxed (PR.5 and PR.6). The distance maxCargoDiam is the maximum diameter
of the cargo objects (PR.7).
Axioms PR.8 through PR.14 characterize the initial state s1. The state s1 is kinematic (PR.8). The box opens vertically
upward (PR.9). The inside of the box is empty (PR.10). Each cargo object constitutes a stable heap supported by oTable1
(PR.11) and separated from every other cargo object (PR.12). No object in u1 is overhung by any other object in u1 or by
oTable1 (PR.13). The inside of the box is altogether above the convex hull of the contact points between the box and the
table (PR.14); this is needed to make sure the box does not fall over (axiom H.4, Section 4.6.3).
Axioms PR.15 through PR.19 deﬁne manipSpace1, the region used to load objects into the box. We have constructed
this deﬁnition so that each object can be lifted vertically, moved horizontally to a position over the inside of the box, and
then lowered vertically into the box; in this part of the constraints, we have given priority to stating the constraints in
simple geometric terms and keeping the proof of correctness easy. The region manipSpace1 is deﬁned as a region that
is at least as high as the top of the box plus the height of any of the cargo objects (PR.15, PR.16). The table is nowhere
higher than the top of the box (PR.17). For each cargo object O , manipSpace1 includes the vertical prism whose x–y
cross section is the convex hull of x–y projections of O and the box, and which extends vertically down from the top
of manipSpace1 a distance which at least the height of O (PR.18). manipSpace1 also includes the region above every
object O in u1 up to the plane at the top of manipSpace1 (PR.19).
Axioms PR.20 through PR.23 enforce the constraint needed to guarantee that the cargo objects will ﬁt in the box and
will not come out discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. This puts an upper bound on the number of cargo objects as a
function of the size of the cargo objects and the size of the inside of the box.
Axioms PR.24 through PR.27 characterize s2, a hypothetical state in which oBox sits on oTable2. (There is no need for
s2 to contain any objects other than oBox and oTable2.) State s2 is kinematic (PR.24). oTable2 is in the same position
in s2 as in s1 (PR.25). In s2, the box sits stably on oTable2 (PR.26), the inside of the box is altogether above the table
(PR.27), and, as in axiom PR.14, the inside of the box is altogether over the convex hull of the contact points between the
box and the table (PR.28). PR.27 is required in order to achieve our goal (PR.35) that all the cargo objects are altogether
above the table.
Axioms PR.29 through PR.31 characterize carryingPath, the trajectory of the box while being carried from oTable1
to oTable2. (Here, by characterizing the space between these two boxes in terms of a trajectory rather than in absolute
17 In the context of problem speciﬁcation and plan speciﬁcation, it is hard to distinguish between deﬁnitions and axioms, so we have lumped them all as
axioms.
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Problem speciﬁcation: Beginning.
PR.1 u1 = uCargo ∪ { oBox }.
PR.2 ∀O∈u1 mobile(O ).
PR.3 oBox = source(qInsideBox)=source(qTopBox).
PR.4 openBox(oBox,qInsideBox,qTopBox).
PR.5 ﬁxed(oTable1).
PR.6 ﬁxed(oTable2).
PR.7 ∀O∈uCargo diameter(O )  maxCargoDiam.
PR.8 holds(s1,kinematicState).
PR.9 ∀P P ∈ value(s1,qTopBox) ⇒ height(P ) = value(s1,top#(↑qInsideBox)).
PR.10 holds(s1,empty(qInsideBox)).
PR.11 ∀O∈u1 holds(s1,stableHeap({O }, { oTable1})).
PR.12 ∀O1,O2∈u1 holds(s1,rccDC#(↑ O1,↑ O2)).
PR.13 ∀O1∈u1∪{oTable1},O2∈u1 ¬holds(s1,partlyAbove#(↑ O1,↑ O2)).
PR.14 holds(s1,altogetherAbove#(↑qInsideBox, convexHull#(↑oBox ∩# ↑oTable1))).
PR.15 ∀O∈uCargo value(s1,top#(↑ O ) −# bottom#(↑ O ))  maxCargoHeight.
PR.16 ∀O∈uCargo value(s1,top#(↑oBox)) + maxCargoHeight < top(manipSpace1).
PR.17 value(s1,top#(↑oTable1)  value(s1,top#(↑oBox)).
PR.18 ∀O∈uCargo,P [xyProj(P ) ∈ value(s1,convexHull#(xyProj#(↑ O∪ ↑ oBox))) ∧
top(manipSpace1)−maxCargoHeight  height(P )  top(manipSpace1) ] ⇒
P ∈manipSpace1.
PR.19 ∀O∈u1,P ,P O holds(s1,P O ∈#↑ O ) ∧ pointAbove(P , P O ) ∧
height(P )  top(manipSpace1) ⇒
P ∈manipSpace1.
Table 30
Problem speciﬁcation: Conclusion.
PR.20 rCuboid ⊂ qInsideBox.
PR.21 cuboid(rCuboid,lCube,wCube,hCube).
PR.22 loadingCount(D, L,W , H) = L/2D · W /2D · H/2D.
PR.23 ∃N count(uCargo,N) ∧
N  loadingCount(maxCargoDiam,lCube,wCube,hCube).
PR.24 holds(s2,kinematicState).
PR.25 sameStateOn(s2,s1,{oTable2}).
PR.26 holds(s2,stableHeap({oBox},{oTable2})).
PR.27 holds(s2,altogetherAbove#(↑qInsideBox,↑oTable2)).
PR.28 holds(s2,altogetherAbove#(↑qInsideBox, convexHull#(↑oBox ∩# ↑oTable2))).
PR.29 sameStateOn(start(carryingPath), s1, {oBox}).
PR.30 sameStateOn(end(carryingPath),s2,{oBox}).
PR.31 ∀S stateOf(S ,carryingPath) ⇒
verticalTilt(valueIn(s1,placement(oBox)), valueIn(S ,placement(oBox))) = 0.
PR.32 throughout(carryingPath,(↑oBox ∪# ↑qInsideBox) ⊂# manipSpace2).
PR.33 holds(S ,isolFluent(problem1)) ≡
[∀O :object holds(S ,rccC#(↑ O ,manipSpace1 ∪ manipSpace2)) ⇒
[O ∈ u1 ∨ O =oTable1 ∨ O =oTable2]]
PR.34 isolationConditions(H ,problem1) ≡ throughout(H ,isolFluent(problem1)).
PR.35 succeeds(problem1,H) ≡ ∀O∈uCargo holds(S ,altogetherAbove(O ,oTable2)).
PR.36 startProblem(problem1) = s1.
geometric terms, we have sacriﬁced stating constraints in normal form in favor of generality.) The trajectory carrying-
Path starts with oBox in its position in s1 (PR.29) and ends with the oBox in its position in s2 (PR.30), and oBox is
held vertically upright throughout carryingPath (PR.31).
As we shall see in Section 4.10, the actual execution of plan1 need not follow carryingPath and need not end with
the box at its position in s2. But the existence of this state and this trajectory guarantees the feasibility of the plan.
Axiom PR.32 characterizes the region manipSpace2 as including the swathe swept out by the box and its inside while
moving it along carryingPath.
Finally, axioms PR.33 through PR.36 characterize the problem problem1. The isolation condition for problem1 is
that no object other than cargo objects, oBox, and the two tables come into contact with either manipSpace1 or ma-
nipSpace2 during the execution of the plan. (PR.33, PR.34). PR.35 deﬁnes the goal of problem as achieving a state where
all the objects in u1 are altogether above oTable2, and where they are in a stable state on oTable2. PR.36 deﬁnes the
starting state of problem1 as s1.
4.10. Speciﬁcation of plan1
Finally, we give the speciﬁcations of the plan. Our objective here is to deﬁne the plan as ﬂexibly as possible. This
ﬂexibility has a number of advantages, depending on the application. For plan execution, it means that the ﬁne details of
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Speciﬁcation of plan1: Symbols.
Symbols:
plan1 → plan.
loadedCargo → ﬂuent[objectSet].
unloadedCargo → ﬂuent[objectSet].
loadBox(U : ﬂuent[objectSet], Q : pseudo, R: region) → plan.
levelCount → integer.
maxBottomHeight(N: integer) → distance.
loadBoxCondition(O : object, H: history, U : ﬂuent[objectSet], Q : pseudo, R: region,
S: state).
carryBox(O B: object, Q I, Q T : pseudo,
UC : objectSet, OT : object, R: region) → plan.
boxLoadingPos(O : object, Q I: pseudo) → ﬂuent[Bool].
goodBoxTrajectory(H: history, O B: object, Q IN, Q T : pseudo, U : objectSet).
safeBoxTilt(S: state, Q IN, Q T : pseudo, O : object).
carryBoxConditions(H: history, O B: object, Q IN, Q T : pseudo,
UC : objectSet, RM: region, O S: object, S: state).
moveTrajectory(H: history, O : object, U : objectSet, S: state, RM: region).
freeAbove(O : object, R: region) → ﬂuent[Bool].
maxHeight(U ) → ﬂuent[distance].
bottom1(P S:pointSet, D:distance).
the plan (the order in which to load the objects, the placement of the objects in the box, the trajectories to follow) can be
tailored to speciﬁc circumstances such as constraints on the way cargo objects should be packed, constraints on the way in
which they should be moved, and limitations of the agent’s manipulators. For plan recognition, the broader the deﬁnition
of the plan, the more behaviors can be recognized as instances of the plan.
Axiom P1.1 gives the high-level description of plan1; the agent loads unloaded objects one by one into the box, waiting
after each loading action until the objects have attained a stable state. The plan is composed of three basic actions:
• loadBox(unloadedCargo,qInsideBox,manipSpace1) is the action of loading some unloaded cargo object into
the inside of the box, moving it through manipSpace1.
• carryBox(oBox,qInsideBox,qTopBox,uCargo,oTable2,manipSpace2) is the action of carrying box oBox
with inside qInsideBox and opening qTopBox and with uCargo inside to its ﬁnal position on oTable2, mov-
ing it through manipSpace2.
• waitUntil(stable(u1 ∪ oTable1)) is the action of waiting until the cargo and the box have reattained a stable position
on oTable1. The semantics of “waitUntil” are deﬁned in Section 4.8.2.
Axioms P1.2 and P1.3 deﬁnes loadedCargo and unloadedCargo as the ﬂuents whose value in any state is the set
of cargo objects in the box/not in the box.
Axioms P1.4–P1.13 deﬁne the semantics of “loadBox” as a partial speciﬁcation of a “move” action. Axioms P1.10 through
P1.13 state that loadBox is executed (is beginnable/worked on/attains completion/attains failure) if in history H if an object
is moved along a trajectory H2 that satisﬁes the “load box conditions”. (There is no failure condition for “loadBox” for the
same reason that there is no failure condition for “move”; a loadBox action fails if it is physically impossible to continue
it.) Axiom P1.9 states that the trajectory H2 meets the load box conditions if the cargo object being loaded ends in an
appropriate “box loading position” and it satisﬁes the predicate “moveTrajectory”. Axioms P1.4–P1.7 deﬁnes “box loading
position” as the constraint described in Section 3.3.2. (The wording of the condition in PL.6 is different, and in fact slightly
less restrictive, than the condition in Section 3.3.2, just because the condition here is easier to state in our ﬁrst-order
theory.) Axiom P1.8 deﬁnes “moveTrajectory(H, O ,U ALSO , S, RM)” as the constraints that history H starts in S; that in
history H , O remains with within the manipulation space RM , and that H is kinematically consistent with all the objects
outside U ALSO remaining motionless. The set U ALSO is the set of objects that should be “brought along” by the move;
speciﬁcally, the cargo objects while the box is being moved.
Note that, although we speciﬁed the situation s1 so that there was room to load each cargo object by moving it up
vertically, then horizontally, then down vertically, the plan does not require that the loading actually be carried out that
way.
Similarly, axioms P1.14–P1.22 characterize “carryBox” as a partial speciﬁcation of a move. Axioms P1.19–P1.22 state that
an execution of carryBox is an execution of a move that satisﬁes the “carry box conditions”. Axiom P1.18 deﬁnes “carryBox-
Conditions” as the constraints that were placed on the ﬁnal situation s2 in axioms PR.25–PR.29 plus the “moveBoxTrajectory”
condition discussed above plus the condition from Section 3.3.3 that the box is never tilted too far from the vertical. This
last condition on tilting is deﬁned in axioms P1.16 and P1.17. Axioms P1.14 and P1.15 deﬁne the maximum and minimum
height of a set of objects (Tables 31–33).
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Speciﬁcation of plan1: Deﬁnition of loadBox.
Axioms:
P1.1 plan1 =
sequence(while(unloadedCargo =# ∅,
sequence(loadBox(unloadedCargo,qInsideBox,manipSpace1),
waitUntil(stable(u1 ∪ {oTable1}))))
carryBox(oBox,qInsideBox,qTopBox,uCargo,oTable2,manipSpace2)).
P1.2 O ∈value(S ,loadedCargo) ⇔ O ∈uCargo ∧ holds(S ,↑ O ⊂#↑qInsideBox).
P1.3 O ∈value(S ,unloadedCargo) ⇔ O ∈uCargo ∧ ¬holds(S ,↑ O ⊂#↑qInsideBox).
P1.4 holds(S ,freeAbove(O , R)) ⇔
¬∃O1∈objectsOf(S) O1 = O ∧ holds(S ,partlyAbove#(↑ O1,↑ O )) ∧
holds(S ,rccO#(↑ O1, R)).
P1.5 levelCount = lCube/ 2* maxCargoDiam * wCube/ 2* maxCargoDiam.
P1.6 maxBottomHeight(N) = 2 · maxCargoDiam * N/levelCount.
P1.7 holds(S ,boxLoadingPos(O , Q I)) ⇔
holds(S ,kinematic) ∧ holds(S ,freeAbove(O ,manipSpace1)) ∧ holds(S ,↑ O ⊂#↑ Q I) ∧
[∃O1∈u1 holds(S, rccEC#(↑ O1,↑ O ))] ∧
∀N count(value(S ,loadedCargo),N) ⇒
holds(S ,height#(↑ centerOfMass(O )) #
bottom#(rCuboid) +# maxBottomHeight#(N) +# maxCargoDiam).
P1.8 moveTrajectory(H, O ,U ALSO , S, RM) ⇔
S = start(H) ∧ throughout(H ,↑ O ⊂# RM) ∧
∀O1∈objectsOf(H) O1 /∈ {O } ∪ U ALSO ⇒
motionless(H, O1) ∧ throughoutxSE(H, rccDC#(O , O1)).
P1.9 loadBoxConditions(O , H,U , Q I, RM, S) ⇔
O ∈value(S,U ) ∧ holds(end(H),boxLoadingPos(O , Q I)) ∧
moveTrajectory(H, O ,∅, S, RM).
P1.10 beginnable(loadBox(U , Q I, RM),S) ⇔
∃O ,H loadBoxConditions(O , H,U , Q I, RM, S).
P1.11 worksOn(loadBox(U , Q I, RM),H) ⇔
∃O ,H2 loadBoxConditions(O , H2,U , Q I, RM ,start(H)) ∧
worksOn(move(O , H2),H).
P1.12 completion(loadBox(U , Q I, RM),H) ⇔
∃O ,H2 loadBoxConditions(O , H2,U , Q I, RM ,start(H)) ∧
completion(move(O , H2),H).
P1.13 ¬failure(loadBox(U , Q I, RM),H).
Table 33
Speciﬁcation of plan1: Deﬁnition of carryBox.
P1.14 ∀U :objectSet,S:state
[∀O∈U ,P holds(S ,P ∈#↑ O ) ⇒ height(P )  value(S ,maxHeight(U ))] ∧
[∃O∈U ,P holds(S, P ∈↑ O ) ∧ height(P ) = value(S ,maxHeight(U ))].
P1.15 bottom1(R, D) ≡
[∀P∈R height(P )  D] ∧ [∃P∈R height(P ) = D].
P1.16 goodBoxTrajectory(H, O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO ) ≡
∀O∈UC ARGO ,S,P H I stateOf(S, H) ∧
P H I = verticalTilt(value(start(H),placement(O B)), value(S ,placement(O B))) ⇒
safeBoxTilt(P H I ,start(H),Q IN, Q T O P , O ).
P1.17 ∀D1 holds(S,bottom1#(↑ Q T O P , D1)) ⇒
[safeBoxTilt(P H I, S1, Q IN, Q T O P , O ) ⇔
0 P H I < π/2 ∧
(D1-value(S,height#(↑centerOfMass(O )))·cos(P H I) >
diameter(O ) + diameter(value(S,xyProj#(↑ Q T O P∪ ↑ Q IN)))·sin(P H I)].
P1.18 carryBoxConditions(H, O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , RM, O S2, S) ⇔
holds(S ,freeSpace(value(end(H),↑ O B))) ∧
holds(end(H),altogetherAbove(↑ Q IN,↑ O S2)) ∧
holds(end(H),altogetherAbove#(↑ Q IN, convexHull#(↑ O B∩# ↑ O S2))) ∧
moveTrajectory(H, O ,UC ARGO , S, RM) ∧
goodBoxTrajectory(H, O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO ).
P1.19 beginnable(carryBox(O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , O S2, RM),S) ⇔
∃H carryBoxConditions(H, O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , RM, O S2, S).
P1.20 worksOn(carryBox(O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , O S2, RM),H) ⇔
∃H2 carryBoxConditions(H2, O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , O S2, RM ,start(H))
∧ worksOn(move(O B, H2),H).
P1.21 completion(carryBox(O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , O S2, RM),H) ⇔
∃H2 carryBoxConditions(H2, O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , O S2, RM ,start(H))
∧ completion(move(O B, H2),H).
P1.22 ¬failure(carryBox(O B, Q IN, Q T O P ,UC ARGO , O S2, RM),H).
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We now can prove the following result: Given all the above, and given that for uhistory j1,
J1.1 start(j1) = startProblem(problem1) = s1.
J1.2 isolationCondition(problem1,j1)
J1.3 attempts(plan1,j1)
one can infer by default that completes(plan1,j1) and succeeds(problem1,j1).
A fully detailed account of the proof is given in the online appendix http://cs.nyu.edu/faculty/davise/box-proof.pdf. The
overall structure of the plan is a straightforward projection, though the details involve a lot of deﬁnition hunting, and a fair
amount of the kind of ﬁddly argumentation characteristic of the analysis of continuous functions over real-valued time.
To analyze the loading loop, we use the following loop invariant: The cargo objects outside the box and the box itself are
in the same position as in s1. The cargo objects inside the box are in a stable position, and satisfy the following packing
constraint: Let K be the number of cargo objects in the box, let H be the greatest height of the center of mass of any cargo
object in the box, and let maxCargoDiam, lCube and wCube be as deﬁned in axioms PR.7 and PR.21. Then
K 
⌊
lCube
2 · maxCargoDiam
⌋
·
⌊
wCube
2 · maxCargoDiam
⌋
·
⌊
H
2 · maxCargoDiam
⌋
.
The main steps of the proof are as follows:
• The loop invariant holds in s1.
• Given the above loop invariant, at the beginning of each iteration, there will exist a loading action that satisﬁes the box
loading constraint.
• Any move that satisﬁes the box loading constraint will execute successfully, and that when it is ﬁnished the new object
will be inside the box and the above packing condition will hold.
• After a loading action is complete and the object being loaded is released, the cargo will settle into a new stable
position with the box remaining ﬁxed, and the cargo objects all remaining inside the box.
• Once the cargo has settled into a stable condition, the loop invariant is satisﬁed.
• The loading loop terminates because the number of unloaded cargo objects decreases on each iteration.
• At the completion of the loading loop, there exists a move that satisﬁes the box carrying constraint.
• If a move satisﬁes the box carrying constraint, then it can be executed successfully, and will result in a state that
satisﬁes the goals of the problem. In particular, the cargo objects do not come out of the box while it is being carried.
It may be noted that we have been careful to avoid the use of default rules until the very last step of the proof. The last
lemma preceding the ﬁnal theorem
Lemma:
start( J ) = s1∧ attempts(plan1, J )∧
throughout( J ,isolFluent) ∧ noAnomaly2( J ) ∧ noAnomUpwardMotion( J ) ⇒
completes(plan1, J ) ∧ succeeds(problem1, J )
has been proved using purely ﬁrst-order logic. Therefore, this lemma has been validly proved even if some problem arises
with the default rules.
6. Conclusion
Among all these trees, it is easy to lose sight of the forest. What we have accomplished is this: We have developed a
theory that is capable of justifying a commonsensically obvious inference about using boxes to carry cargo. The inference
requires only qualitative constraints about the shapes and physical characteristics of the objects involved. The theory is
designed to be elaboration tolerant and consistent with Newtonian physics; it contains no features that get in the way
of extending it to cover both other commonsense inferences in the domain and precise calculations based on Newtonian
mechanics. As discussed in the introduction, our formulation of the physical laws used in this inference entirely avoids the
analysis of forces, and almost entirely avoids the use of axioms that use differential time (the only exceptions are axioms
K.5 and DYN.12).
The theory, the boundary conditions that deﬁne the problem, and the representation of the plan, are certainly more
complicated than one would at ﬁrst have supposed necessary for such an obvious inference in such a simple domain. But
on careful consideration, it seems clear that a commonsense understanding of the domain and of this inference involves
all, or nearly all, of the sorts that we have deﬁned, and is aware of all, or nearly all, of the potential “bugs” that we have
enumerated in Section 3.3. Therefore it seems reasonable to say that the complexity of our theory is mostly a reﬂection of
the complexity of the domain and the sophistication of a commonsense understanding, and only in small part an artifact of
the awkwardness of ﬁtting this kind of commonsense reasoning to the limitations of deductive inference in ﬁrst-order logic.
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claim that any actual commonsense reasoner thinks about conditions PR.23 and PR.24 or knows that these conditions are
suﬃcient to ensure that the box can be loaded without fear of overﬂowing. But a commonsense understanding is aware of
something quite similar: namely, that if care is taken to load the box from bottom up, the space will be used reasonably
eﬃciently; and that, if objects are small and not too numerous, a reasonably eﬃcient packing of the box will succeed in
ﬁtting them all inside the box. Moreover, the commonsense understander has a “feel” for how small the objects should
be, how few they should be, and how much care needs to be taken in packing them. The precise numerical constraints
PR.23, PR.24 here are the closest we have been able to come to representing the knowledge that constitutes this “feel”.
The numerical constraints are not, I would argue, as far from the “feel” as it might seem at ﬁrst; and they are certainly no
further than what can be expressed in any other notation that I know of. Despite the scorn that is often heaped on the very
idea that symbolic representations could be acceptable cognitive models for spatial knowledge,18 no other representational
system, especially “diagrammatic” representations, comes anything like as close to capturing the critical cognitive ability to
represent and reason about qualitative spatial and physical information.
Establishing the consistency of this large and complex theory, even aside from the default rules, is certainly a concern.
The major crux is likely to be ﬁnding a class of dynamic histories that satisﬁes both the existence and closure axioms
DYN.2–DYN.14 and also the rules for heaps H.2 to H.4. Another problem is that there is an inherent tension between DYN.6,
which excludes any kind of hysteresis, and default rule UP.1, which has hysteresis built in (the motions possible to objects
in the heap at one time depend on their positions relative to the support at a different time.) I don’t think that these are
actually inconsistent, but it is certainly possible that they suﬃce to rule out important forms of “settling” if the box is tilted
while being carried.
The work in this paper is only a ﬁrst step in the analysis of commonsense knowledge about solid objects. The most
important open problems in this analysis, which we hope to address in future work, are:
• Incorporating a probabilistic theory or some other theory of relative likelihoods.
• Analyzing the unloading of the box.
• Merging this theory with the Newtonian theory of forces.
• Developing a more realistic model of manipulation.
• Extending the theory of the stability of heaps under perturbations (motions of the supports, contacts with external
objects, and impacts of external objects).
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